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ABSTRACT
For the past decade, the learned intermediary rule—the rule of tort law
that provides that drug manufacturers may satisfy their duty to warn of a
drug’s dangers by warning the prescribing physician rather than the end user
of the drug—has been the subject of vigorous academic debate. That debate
has been largely moot, however, as the courts have proven reluctant to make
significant inroads on the protection offered by the Rule to drug
manufacturers. This Article proposes a new approach to the Rule. Part I
discusses the history and overwhelming adoption of the Rule pursuant to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Part II argues that changes in the health care
delivery system have resulted in a legal system that introduces market
distortions by effectively immunizing the pharmaceutical industry from the
legal and social consequences of its own actions. Part III then sets forth a
reconceptualization of the Rule, which preserves the Rule’s benefits with respect
to the drug industry, the health care system, and the goals of tort law, while
also strengthening the protection the tort system offers to individuals injured by
prescription drugs.
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INTRODUCTION
As this Article is being written, the fortieth anniversary of the
1
learned intermediary rule —the rule of tort law which provides that
drug manufacturers may satisfy their duty to warn of a drug’s dangers
by warning the prescribing physician rather than the end user of the
drug—is two years away. In 1966, when the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit coined the term “learned intermediary
2
rule” in the case of Sterling Drug v. Cornish, President Lyndon
3
4
Johnson was in the White House and Dr. Kildare was on television.
5
Dr. Kildare, like Marcus Welby, who followed him, remains an icon
of the traditional American health care system: a primary care
physician devoted to his patients. A vast literature chronicles the
change (some would say the decline) from the fee-for-service health
care system of that time with its emphasis on the dyadic, paternalistic
physician–patient relationship, to the modern, twenty-first century
health care system with its triadic managed care relationships and
6
uncertain authority structure.
Strangely, in the face of these
revolutionary changes in medical practice, as well as a substantial
critical scholarly literature, the learned intermediary rule as applied
by courts has remained virtually unchanged from its first articulation
in 1966 until the present day. Simply stated, and subject to a few

1

References to “the Rule” in this Article, unless otherwise specified, are to the
learned intermediary rule.
2
370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966). Although the phrase “learned intermediary
rule” was coined by the Sterling Drug court, the concepts behind the Rule predate its
naming. See, e.g., Magee v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 322, 350-51 (Ct. App.
1963).
3
THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/index2.html (last visited Aug. 25,
2004).
4
TIM BROOKS & EARLE MARSH, THE COMPLETE DIRECTORY TO PRIME TIME
NETWORK AND CABLE TELEVISION SHOWS: 1946-PRESENT 268 (7th ed. 1999).
5
Dr. Kildare was broadcast from 1961 to 1966. Id. Marcus Welby, M.D.,
premiered in 1969 and ran until 1976. Id. at 627-28.
6
See generally PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN
THE MANAGED CARE ERA (2002); E. HAAVI MORREIM, BALANCING ACT: THE NEW
MEDICAL ETHICS OF MEDICINE’S NEW ECONOMICS (1995); Carl F. Ameringer, Devolution
and Distrust: Managed Care and the Resurgence of Physician Power and Authority, 5 DEPAUL
J. HEALTH CARE L. 187, 187-93 (2002); Dionne Koller Fine, Physician Liability and
Managed Care: A Philosophical Perspective, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 641, 644-53 (2003);
Joseph Gottfried & Frank A. Sloan, The Quality of Managed Care: Evidence from the
Medical Literature, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 103-29 (2002); Thomas L.
Greaney, From Hero to Goat: Managed Care in the 1990s, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 217, 217-19
(2003); Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed Care, and How to Fix It,
51 UCLA L. REV. 457, 462-64 (2003); Daniel P. Maher, Managed Care and Undividing
Loyalties, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 703, 703-05 (2002).
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narrowly applied exceptions, the mere fact that a prescription drug is
7
at issue in a failure-to-warn tort case automatically vitiates the
manufacturer’s duty to warn the end user of dangers posed by the
product. Courts almost unanimously apply a virtually irrebuttable
presumption that the end user’s physician is the only appropriate
source for warnings of a drug’s potential dangers. As Part II of this
Article will show, the current state of the American health care system
no longer permits such an unreflective assumption.
This Article proposes a reworking of failure-to-warn doctrine and
the learned intermediary rule more suited to the changed health care
marketplace faced today by patients, physicians, pharmacists, and
pharmaceutical manufacturers. In the twenty-first century American
managed health care system, patients receive far less personalized
attention from their physicians, and are seen by a greater variety and
diversity of physicians, than in the past. The average length of an
office visit is shorter under aggressive managed care cost containment
8
structures, providing less time for personal interaction and fewer
opportunities for physicians to educate and inform their patients.
Additionally, managed care organizations (“MCOs”) increasingly
exert control over the doctor–patient relationship, including the
choice of prescription drugs, through the use of pre-authorization
9
requirements, formularies, and pharmacy benefit managers.
At the same time, the opportunities for successful medical
treatment, including pharmacological treatment, are more extensive
7

Although the learned intermediary rule has been applied to medical devices as
well as prescription drugs, see, e.g., Johnson v. Zimmer, Inc., No. Civ. 02-1328, 2004
WL 742038, at *9-10 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2004) (prosthetic femoral hip stem);
McCombs v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 587 S.E.2d 594, 594-96 (Ga. 2003) (spinal plate);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(c) (1997) [hereinafter
THIRD RESTATEMENT], this Article will focus on the Rule in the prescription drug
context. The process of development, approval, promotion, and sale of medical
devices is materially different from that of prescription drugs, and analysis of whether
a conclusive presumption of a learned intermediary is appropriate in the medical
device context is reserved for another day.
8
R. Balkrishman et al., Capitation Payment, Length of Visit and Preventive Services:
Evidence from a National Sample of Outpatient Physicians, 8 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 332,
337 (2002); Peifeng Hu & David B. Reuben, Effects of Managed Care on the Length of
Time That Elderly Patients Spend with Physicians During Ambulatory Visits, 40 MED. CARE
606, 610-12 (2002). Both of these articles point out that the length of office visits
appears to be more closely related to the type of reimbursement than the type of
insurance. For a report reaching the opposite conclusion, that managed care does
not seem to have altered the length of office visits, see David Mechanic et al., Are
Patients’ Office Visits with Physicians Getting Shorter?, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 198, 201-03
(2001).
9
For a discussion of the rise of managed care’s control over the distribution of
prescription drugs, see Sharlow Johnson, PBMs: Ripe for Regulation, 57 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 323, 328-31 (2002).

2004

LEARNED INTERMEDIARY RULE

197

than they have ever been, and drug manufacturers’ research and
development budgets have increased commensurately. In addition to
medically necessary drugs, drug manufacturers have increasingly
turned their attention to producing therapies for conditions that
would not have been considered suitable candidates for medical
intervention forty years ago. Products such as Viagra, Rogaine,
10
Botox, and others have proven to be lucrative products for their
manufacturers, despite the sometimes questionable necessity for
these so-called “lifestyle” drugs.
Finally, the modern medical marketplace focuses on the patient
as consumer to an extent unimaginable forty years ago. In 1966, the
paternalistic relationship between doctor and patient precluded any
direct communication between the manufacturer of a drug and end
users of that drug. Opportunities to learn about available treatments,
except from one’s physician in the context of a face-to-face
11
consultation, were virtually nonexistent.
Today, by contrast, the
Internet supplies voluminous information on virtually every drug and
12
alternative therapy on demand to one’s desktop or living room. In
addition to this wealth of information available for the asking,
pharmaceutical products are routinely touted in television, print, and
Internet advertisements. Direct-to-consumer advertising occupies an
ever-growing percentage of drug companies’ vast promotional
budgets, and studies show that such advertisements are effective in
13
creating demand for specific brand-name drugs. With the advent of
14
Internet-based pharmacies, it is even possible (though illegal) for
10

Such pharmaceuticals developed and marketed primarily for their cosmetic
effects, rather than for the treatment of a traditional medical “illness,” will be
referred to in this Article as “lifestyle” drugs. For a discussion of the difficulty of
definitively classifying a particular drug as a “lifestyle” drug, see infra Part II.A.3.
11
The only prescription pharmaceutical advertisements undertaken by drug
companies in the 1960s were targeted directly to physicians or other health care
professionals through medical and other industry journals unlikely to be accessible
to the average patient. See infra notes 193–95 and accompanying text.
12
Studies consistently show a large percentage of American Internet users search
for health information online, and several companies have started high-profile
Internet medical information resource websites. See, e.g., http://www.drkoop.com
(last visited Aug. 27, 2004); http://www.webmd.com (last visited Aug. 27, 2004).
13
See, e.g., Simon Gilbody et al., Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Psychotropics: An
Emerging and Evolving Form of Pharmaceutical Company Influence, 185 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY
1, 1-2 (2004); Barbara Mintzes et al., How Does Direct-to-Consumer Advertising (DTCA)
Affect Prescribing? A Survey in Primary Care Environments with and without Legal DTCA,
169 CAN. MED. ASS’N. J. 405, 408-09 (2003); Elizabeth Murray et al., Direct-to-Consumer
Advertising: Physicians’ Views of Its Effects on Quality of Care and the Doctor–Patient
Relationship, 16 J. AM. BOARD FAM. PRAC. 513, 513-24 (2003).
14
For an excellent discussion of the legal limits on Internet pharmacies and the
extent to which existing Internet pharmacies disregard or operate beyond the reach
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consumers to purchase prescription drugs in the absence of a
meaningful physician–patient relationship; indeed, without any
15
contact with a licensed physician. Doctors Welby and Kildare would
be shocked and bewildered by the sheer volume and diversity of
16
information and alternatives available to today’s patients.
This Article surveys these and other changes in the health care
marketplace in the past forty years and critically examines the
continued vitality of the learned intermediary rule in light of these
changes. I conclude that the learned intermediary rule in its current
form does not adequately reflect the realities of the modern health
care system and I propose reworking the Rule to better regulate
today’s pharmaceutical marketplace and better accomplish the main
17
goals of tort law: compensation, deterrence, and cost allocation.
The diversity of the modern health care system, recent changes
in the development and marketing of prescription drugs, and the
increased ethical emphasis on the autonomy and responsibility of the
patient lead to the conclusion that the learned intermediary rule
should no longer be applied as a bright-line exception for
prescription drugs in modern failure-to-warn jurisprudence. Rather,
courts should undertake a fact-based inquiry to determine whether
the drug in question was in fact sold in the absence of an effective
intermediary. The focus should not be on the type of product being
sold, but rather on the quality of the doctor–patient interaction that
results in the prescription and use of the drug.
In fact, tort law already uses such a rule, but not in the
prescription drug context. Manufacturers selling products other
than drugs through intermediaries have also argued that the duty to
warn the ultimate user of the product should be delegable to the
intermediary and, in appropriate cases, courts have been willing to
allow manufacturers to satisfy their duty to warn by simply warning an
intermediary. The major difference between this “sophisticated user
doctrine” and the learned intermediary rule is the level of analysis
that courts are willing to undertake to determine whether delegation
of the duty to warn to an intermediary is appropriate.
Part I of this Article begins with a brief history and description of
the learned intermediary rule as currently applied. Part II then
of those legal limits, see John Blum, Internet Medicine and the Evolving Legal Status of the
Physician–Patient Relationship, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 413, 439-48 (2003).
15
See id.; see also infra Part II.A.4.
16
Cf. Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1246 (N.J. 1999) (“Our medicallegal jurisprudence is based on images of health care that no longer exist.”).
17
Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REV.
772, 772 (1985).
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surveys the ways in which the Rule as it exists fails to reflect modern
medical practice, pharmaceutical marketing, and medical ethics.
Part III concludes that the Rule should, rather than merely being
abrogated for some or all categories of drug sales, be reformed to
reflect the fact that in today’s health care delivery environment, not
all prescription drug sales occur in the presence and with the
assistance and protection of an effective learned intermediary. I
propose changes in the application of the learned intermediary rule
to bring the law’s presumptions into line with the modern health care
marketplace and to provide an incentive to drug manufacturers and
the health care delivery system to improve the lines of
communication between health care providers and patients.
I.

THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY RULE

Prescription drugs have long held a special place in American
products liability law, having been singled out as “unavoidably
18
unsafe” by the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The law has struggled
with the proper balance between the interests of individuals harmed
19
by unavoidably unsafe products and the interest of society in
encouraging the development and marketing of innovative
pharmaceutical products in the face of the undeniable risk posed by
20
those products. The standard formula of strict products liability is
widely, and correctly, regarded as unworkable in the prescription
18

Comment k to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states in relevant

part:
There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended
and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of
drugs. . . . [B]oth the marketing and the use of [prescription drugs]
are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk
which they involve.
Such a product, properly prepared, and
accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is
it unreasonably dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965) [hereinafter SECOND
RESTATEMENT].
19
Although eager plaintiffs’ attorneys occasionally forget, injury is a prerequisite
to maintenance of an action for failure to warn. See Heindel v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ.A.
02-3348, 2004 WL 1398024, at *1 (D.N.J. June 7, 2004) (granting defendant’s motion
for summary judgment where plaintiffs alleged no actual injury from taking
prescription drugs, but only claimed “‘economic injuries’ they suffered due to
[d]efendants’ failure to publicize the results of two clinical studies that revealed
possible risks associated with the use of the drugs”).
20
See generally Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1195-96 (Alaska 1992);
Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 339-40 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Bennett v. Madakasira,
821 So. 2d 794, 809 (Miss. 2002); Pollard v. Ashby, 793 S.W.2d 394, 399-400 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1990); Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 304 A.2d 562, 563-65 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1973); Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383, 1387 (Pa. 1991).
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21

drug context because of the uncertainty and complexity attendant
on medical treatment and the possibility that strict tort liability might
chill research and development of new pharmaceutical products.
The precise parameters of the law’s treatment of these products,
however, are no longer adequately calibrated to give effect to the
purposes behind tort law.
A. Safe Harbor for Manufacturers
According to the principles of strict liability, the predominant
22
American products liability doctrine, a manufacturer or seller of a
defective product is liable to the product’s end user for injuries
caused by that product without regard to whether the manufacturer
23
or seller was negligent in the manufacture or sale of the product.
The drafters of the Second Restatement, however, noted a different rule
24
for “[u]navoidably unsafe” products. Imposition of strict liability for
injuries caused by such products would impair an industry’s ability to
market a socially desirable product and would deprive society of the
25
benefit of that product. Therefore, injury resulting from the use of
these products generates tort liability for manufacturers only when
26
Generally speaking,
the products are “unreasonably dangerous.”
unavoidably unsafe products are unreasonably dangerous when the
end user of the product does not know of, or has no reason to know
of, the dangers presented by the product and so is unable to take
21

See, e.g., Hahn v. Richter, 673 A.2d 888, 889-90 (Pa. 1996); T. Leigh Anenson,
Great Expectations: The Role of the Consumer in Determining Effective Design, 38 TORT TRIAL
& INS. PRAC. L.J. 963, 986 (2003). Not all courts recognize this, however. See Foister
v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 693, 705 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (“As this action
involves a dangerous prescription drug, it is governed by the rules of strict liability.”).
22
See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 1 cmt. a (describing the historic
growth of strict products liability as “a discrete area of tort law which borrows from
both negligence and warranty”).
23
Section 402A of the Second Restatement states: “One who sells any product in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer . . . is subject to
liability . . . although . . . the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product . . . .” SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 402A. This
principle of strict liability is reaffirmed in the Third Restatement, which provides:
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing
products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject to
liability for harm . . . caused by the defect. . . . A product . . . contains a
manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended
design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation
and marketing of the product . . . .
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, §§ 1-2.
24
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 402A cmt. k.
25
See id.
26
See id. § 402A cmt. i.
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these dangers into account when making the decision whether to use
the product by balancing its expected benefits against its potential
27
harms. Thus, manufacturers can avoid liability arising out of the use
of unavoidably unsafe products by distributing them with legally
adequate warnings and instructions for use. The analysis applicable
to unavoidably unsafe products, therefore, carries within it a
28
negligence-based reasonableness inquiry.
The category of unavoidably unsafe products, as the drafters of
the Second Restatement recognized, encompasses the vast majority of, if
29
not all, prescription drugs. All drugs present potential dangers in
30
addition to their touted benefits. Although the manufacturer need
31
not explicitly warn against obvious dangers, potential drug
interactions and side effects are not the sorts of dangers that are
obvious upon inspection of the product.
Therefore, both
instructions as to the correct use of the product and warnings as to
the potential consequences of both proper and improper use are
32
necessary.
27

Id. This analysis mirrors the doctrine of informed consent, in which
knowledge of and assent to risk eliminates liability for harms resulting from that risk,
and thus demonstrates respect for the autonomy of the patient. Of course, under
standard principles of informed consent, a physician can be held liable for failing to
transmit adequate warnings to the patient. See Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 2002-SC0746-CL, 2004 WL 1361954, at *9-10 (Ky. June 17, 2004). This theory of liability,
while providing another source of remedy for the patient injured by a prescription
drug, is largely beyond the scope of this Article.
28
See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 1 cmt. a (noting that although “many
courts insist on speaking of [failure-to-warn and defective design liability] as being
‘strict,’” those theories of liability actually “rely on a reasonableness test traditionally
used in determining whether an actor has been negligent”). Prescription drug
litigation is virtually never conducted on a defective design theory. Id. § 6(c) & cmt.
b (discussing the “traditional refusal by courts to impose tort liability for defective
designs of prescription drugs”).
29
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 402A cmt. k.
30
See infra note 261 and accompanying text (discussing the over-the-counter drug
market).
31
Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 331 n.70 (5th Cir. 1998)
(observing that “a product seller is not liable for failure to warn of risks ‘that should
be obvious to, or generally known by, foreseeable product users’”) (quoting THIRD
RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 2 cmt. j.).
32
The distinction between instructions and warnings is well-developed in the
products liability literature. See, e.g., Natural Gas Odorizing, Inc. v. Downs, 685
N.E.2d 155, 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that Indiana law requires manufacturer
to provide both adequate instructions for proper use of product and warnings of
dangers from improper use); see also THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 1 cmt. a
(discussing history of products liability as it relates to use of “instructions or
warnings”). Following the convention in the literature, however, references to
“warnings” in this Article should be read to refer to both warnings and instructions
unless otherwise specified.
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Since warnings and instructions are necessary to enable the
reasonably safe use of prescription drugs, and to allow the
manufacturer to avoid liability for those injuries that will unavoidably
occur from the use of the product, the manufacturer must determine
how to satisfy its legal duty to warn and instruct. Discharge of this
duty has two facets: the content of the warning and the means of
communicating the warning. In this, the drug manufacturer has a
decided advantage over manufacturers of other unavoidably unsafe
products. Ordinarily, a legally effective warning must be reasonably
designed to capture the attention of the end user of the product. An
otherwise unobjectionable warning which is diluted by overly
33
favorable descriptions of the product, not communicated in an
34
35
efficient manner, or hidden from clear view is of no use to the
consumer and cannot be relied on as a shield against liability.
In stark contrast to this ordinary rule of tort law, an adequate
warning of the dangers of a prescription drug need not be
communicated to the end user at all, but only to the prescribing
physician. The prescribing physician, so the theory goes, acts as a
“learned intermediary” between the end user and the drug
manufacturer. She is an “intermediary” because a prescription drug
cannot be legally obtained without a prescription from a licensed
36
physician.
She is “learned” because of the extensive medical
33

For cases recognizing that a warning could be nullified by “overpromotion” of
the product, which had the effect of diluting the warning’s effectiveness, see, e.g.,
Salmon v. Parke Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1363 (4th Cir. 1975) (interpreting
North Carolina law); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 661 (Cal. 1973);
Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1238 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Baldino v.
Castagna, 478 A.2d 807, 810 (Pa. 1984).
34
For cases finding that a warning not adequately communicated to prescribing
physicians is not legally effective, see, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d
652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981) (interpreting New Hampshire law); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v.
Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 549 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Baker v. St. Agnes Hosp., 421
N.Y.S.2d 81, 85-86 (App. Div. 1979).
35
Wright ex rel. Trust Co. of Kan. v. Abbott Labs., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1201 (D.
Kan. 1999) (finding a warning adequate because, inter alia, it was “not concealed or
hidden on some remote part of a large piece of machinery . . . [but] clearly
emblazoned on the package label and repeatedly stated on the package insert”).
36
Restrictions on the legal sale of prescription drugs are contained in the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetics Act. Specifically, 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) provides that drugs, which
are approved by the FDA as prescription drugs:
shall be dispensed only (i) upon a written prescription of a practitioner
licensed by law to administer such drug, or (ii) upon an oral
prescription of such practitioner which is reduced promptly to writing
and filed by the pharmacist, or (iii) by refilling any such written or oral
prescription if such refilling is authorized by the prescriber either in
the original prescription or by oral order which is reduced promptly to
writing and filed by the pharmacist.
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training that enables her to comprehend the content of a complete
and necessarily technical and complex warning about the drug.
Training and experience allow the physician to translate the
technical details concerning the potential therapeutic benefits and
known risks of the drug into specific recommendations and
instructions for use by the individual patient. In the absence of
37
either of these factors, the Rule should not apply.
The first mention of the learned intermediary rule by that name
38
occurred in 1966 in the case of Sterling Drug v. Cornish. From that
beginning, the Rule was quickly and widely adopted by state and
39
federal courts. In Sterling Drug, the plaintiff alleged that a warning
given to her physician by the drug manufacturer was inadequate
because it did not disclose a known, although rare, side effect of the
40
drug prescribed for her.
The Sterling Drug court distinguished
41
prescription drugs from “normal consumer item[s],” holding that
the law required a warning to the prescribing physician, but the court
gave no rationale for an accompanying exemption from the duty to
42
warn the consumer directly.
Moreover, comment k to section 402A of the Second Restatement

21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (2000).
37
This is an application of the familiar legal maxim of cessante ratione legis cessat et
ipsa lex, translated as, “Where the reason for the rule ceases, there the law itself also
ceases.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY app. B at 1708 (8th ed. 2004). As will be shown in
Part I.C, infra, however, courts have not heeded this rule of construction in the
prescription drug context.
38
370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966). The Sterling Drug court stated: “In [a
prescription drug] case the purchaser’s doctor is a learned intermediary between the
purchaser and the manufacturer. If the doctor is properly warned of the possibility
of a side effect in some patients, and is advised of the symptoms . . . there is an
excellent chance that injury to the patient can be avoided.” Id. The court made this
statement in the context of distinguishing the case at bar, in which plaintiff suffered
a known but rare side effect, from cases holding that a manufacturer has no duty to
warn of risks to hypersensitive or allergic plaintiffs. Id. The purposes behind the
rule are clearly apparent in the Sterling Drug court’s statement of the rule.
39
See Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829, 838 n.11 (Conn. 2001) (listing fortyfour state and federal jurisdictions that have adopted the Rule); Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc.,
No. 2002-SC-0746-CL, 2004 WL 1361954, at *8 & n.3 (Ky. June 17, 2004) (listing
thirty-four states that have adopted the Rule); see also 2 FRANK C. WOODSIDE, III, M.D.,
J.D., DRUG PRODUCT LIABILITY § 14.02[2][b][i], at 14-39 (“The learned intermediary
doctrine is nearly universally accepted with respect to warnings for prescription
drugs . . . .”).
40
Sterling Drug, 370 F.2d at 83-84.
41
Id. at 85.
42
In fact, the Sterling Drug court did not expressly state that the warning given to
the physician stands in place of a legally adequate warning to the consumer, but
merely stated that, if a warning is given to the physician, “there is an excellent chance
that injury to the patient can be avoided.” Id.
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does not expressly support the corollary that the duty to warn the
prescribing physician supersedes, rather than supplements, a duty to
43
warn the user of the product.
That corollary was soon firmly
44
established, however. In the 1973 case of Gravis v. Parke-Davis & Co.,
the plaintiff alleged injury from the use of novocain as a spinal
anesthetic, and sought damages from the drug’s manufacturer under
45
a failure-to-warn theory. The manufacturer had provided a warning
46
to the physician but not to the patient. The Court dispensed with
the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim by stating: “We believe that it was
unreasonable to suppose that a drug manufacturer must go beyond
the physician and give actual warnings to the patient. Once the
physician has been warned, the choice of which drugs to use, and the
47
duty to explain the risks involved, is his.” The Gravis court gave
three justifications for not requiring a drug manufacturer to warn the
patient directly: (1) “The entire system of drug distribution in
America is set up so as to place the responsibility of distribution and
use upon professional people”; (2) “professionals are in the best
position to evaluate the warning put out by the drug industry”; and
(3) “[g]enerally speaking, only a physician would understand the
48
propensities and dangers involved.” Today, it is clear that the Rule
consists of two parts: (1) the manufacturer’s provision of a legally
adequate warning to the prescribing physician and (2) the
49
accompanying exemption from the duty to warn the end user. As
43

Comment k to section 402A of the Second Restatement states in relevant part that
an unavoidably unsafe product, “properly prepared, and accompanied by proper
directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.” SECOND
RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 402A cmt. k. Section 402A, however, does not answer
the question of to whom “proper directions and warning[s]” must be given. Id.
44
502 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); see also Davis v. Wyeth Labs., 399 F.2d
121, 130 (9th Cir. 1968). Although Gravis cites to a 1955 case for the proposition
that there is no duty to warn the patient directly, the cited case does not stand for the
proposition that a drug manufacturer has no duty to warn the patient directly, but
rather that a physician’s failure to disclose the known dangers of a particular
anesthetic was not negligence because the patient had impliedly consented to the
administration of an anesthetic during childbirth. See Hall v. United States, 136 F.
Supp. 187, 193 (W.D. La. 1955).
45
Gravis, 502 S.W.2d at 869-70. The Gravis case was a particularly apt one for the
application of the learned intermediary rule, since the drug at issue was a surgical
anesthetic, and one would ordinarily not expect a patient to concern himself with
the details of this choice. In Gravis, the drug in question was not itself the treatment,
but merely a means to effecting the surgical treatment sought by the plaintiff.
46
See id. at 870.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
See generally Goodson v. Searle Labs., 471 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D. Conn. 1978);
Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 548 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Whitley
v. Cubberly, 210 S.E.2d 289, 292 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974); McEwen v. Ortho Pharm.
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Parts II and III of this Article will show, however, the justifications
offered for the learned intermediary rule have changed very little
50
since 1973, despite vast changes in the health care delivery system.
B. Recognized Exceptions
Even the learned intermediary rule in its current form
acknowledges that in some situations prescription drugs are
dispensed in circumstances which do not permit delegation of the
duty to warn to the prescribing physician. The few recognized
exceptions to the learned intermediary rule each attempt to identify
a category of prescription drug use in which there is no effective
intermediary to intercede between the manufacturer and the
consumer of prescription drugs. While these exceptions have been
somewhat successful in identifying common situations in which drugs
are dispensed outside the doctor–patient relationship, in practice
they are both underinclusive and overinclusive, and thus fail to
adequately police the pharmaceutical marketplace. For example,
because of the rapid pace of change in the health care market, there
are now more drug sales than ever occurring outside the context of
the doctor–patient relationship, and many of these sales are not
51
captured by the current exceptions. Furthermore, the mechanistic
application of the exceptions by most courts may in some cases
remove the protections of the learned intermediary rule even though
a drug was in fact dispensed in the context of a doctor–patient
relationship. Thus, in their current form, the generally recognized
exceptions fail to carry out the purposes of the Rule.
1.

Mass Vaccines

The most widely recognized exception to the learned
intermediary rule is the mass immunization exception under which
vaccinations delivered in a clinic without significant participation by a
physician do not qualify for the protection of the learned
52
intermediary rule. Warnings of the risks attendant on such vaccines
Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 529 (Or. 1974).
50
See infra Parts II & III.B.
51
See infra notes 185–86 and accompanying text (describing online sales of
prescription drugs without a prescription).
52
The learned intermediary rule, and the tort system generally, have been
significantly altered in the childhood vaccine area by the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, tit. III, 100 Stat. 3743, 3755 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (2000)). This Act was passed by Congress
in 1986 in response to a growing number of lawsuits alleging injury from childhood
vaccinations. It essentially establishes a national compensation fund, the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, for injuries from such vaccinations, without
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must therefore be delivered and tailored to the vaccine’s recipient.
This exception is explicitly grounded in the lack of physician
participation in the medical decision-making process. Since the
patient does not have an opportunity to receive the benefit of a
physician’s individualized judgment as to the desirability of the
vaccine, the manufacturer of the vaccine cannot expect a physician to
deliver a suitable warning to the patient or to exercise independent
medical judgment in helping the patient make a decision whether or
54
not to use the product.
Significantly, the same vaccine,
administered under a physician’s direction during an office visit, is
subject to the learned intermediary rule, and assuming a legally
adequate warning to the physician, an injured patient cannot look to
55
the vaccine manufacturer for compensation.
The mass vaccine exception was the first exception to the

regard to negligence or fault.
It also limits tort lawsuits against vaccine
manufacturers for injuries which are compensable from the Program. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2) (barring some civil lawsuits against vaccine manufacturers
until after a petition for compensation is filed with the Program), § 300aa-21
(providing that, after a judgment is entered on a petition filed with the Program, the
petitioner may elect to receive the compensation (if any) awarded under the
Program or else file a civil suit for damages). The Act, however, does not bar all such
lawsuits. See Schafer v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 20 F.3d 1, 5-7 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding
that parents’ claims for loss of consortium are not barred). Therefore, the Act does
not render the tort system, or the learned intermediary rule, entirely obsolete in this
area.
53
See generally Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1436 (8th Cir. 1984); Reyes v.
Wyeth Labs., Inc., 498 F.2d 1264, 1275 (5th Cir. 1974); Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399
F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968); Allison v. Merck & Co., 878 P.2d 948, 957-58 (Nev.
1994); Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377, 1381 (Okla. 1974).
54
In cases of unavoidably unsafe products, unlike other products which carry
warnings, the purpose of the warning is not to enable the consumer to use the
product more safely (although certain warnings may in fact serve that purpose in the
prescription drug context, such as a warning that the drug will make the user drowsy
and should not be used while operating heavy machinery). Rather, such warnings
are used solely to allow the user to make an informed decision whether or not to use
the product at all, since many of the risks of these products are not avoidable, no
matter how safely the product is used. See, e.g., Thomas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc.,
949 F.2d 806, 813 (5th Cir. 1992) (“[T]here are two very different types of warnings
that might be associated with a particular product: (1) an unavoidable risk warning;
and (2) a preventable risk warning.”). Thus, courts have required plaintiffs to show,
in cases of unavoidable risks, that the requested warning would have changed their
behavior instead of establishing the issue via the presumption that a preventable risk
warning would have been heeded. Id. at 814 (declining to adopt the presumption
under Mississippi law). But see Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1281 (adopting the presumption of
causation in an unavoidable risk case under Texas law).
55
See, e.g., Hurley v. Lederle Labs. Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 863 F.2d 1173, 1178
(5th Cir. 1989). To the extent that this represents an effort by the courts to tailor the
application of the learned intermediary rule to specific circumstances of the drug’s
use, this is entirely consistent with the thesis of this Article.
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learned intermediary rule to be articulated. In Reyes v. Wyeth
56
57
Laboratories, a plaintiff allegedly injured by the polio vaccine sued
the vaccine’s manufacturer. The vaccine had been administered by a
registered nurse as part of a clinic-based childhood immunization
58
program.
Although Wyeth, the manufacturer, had provided
package insert warnings with the vaccine to the nurses administering
the injections, neither the nurses nor the consent form signed by
plaintiff’s parent conveyed any of the warning information to the
59
patient.
60
The jury found for the plaintiff. On appeal, Wyeth argued that
the trial court had erred in not applying the learned intermediary
61
rule to the case. In fact, the appellate court could have resolved this
case in Wyeth’s favor under the learned intermediary rule. Wyeth
had provided full disclosure of the risks of the vaccine to the health
62
care providers involved, and the health care providers had at least
two opportunities to convey those warnings to the patient’s parent,
63
but chose not to do so.
The court could have concluded that
responsibility for the failure to warn rested with the health care
professional and not the drug manufacturer. The court, however,
chose instead to articulate an exception to the Rule for mass
vaccinations.
The mass vaccine exception is the clearest and most widely
accepted exception to the learned intermediary rule. In cases like
Reyes, there is no intermediary, or at least no effective intermediary,
between the patient and the manufacturer. Although there is a
health care professional administering the vaccine, that professional
64
is usually not a licensed physician.
Furthermore, the vaccine is
56

498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).
Although defendant Wyeth Laboratories (“Wyeth”) contested the issue at trial
by claiming that the plaintiff’s polio was in fact a “wild” strain not present in its
vaccine, the jury rejected this theory by holding Wyeth responsible for the plaintiff’s
injuries. Id. at 1271.
58
Id. at 1270.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 1269.
61
Id. at 1277 (rejecting Wyeth’s argument that prior cases should be
distinguished).
62
For a discussion of the status of nurses and other non-physician health care
workers under the learned intermediary rule, see infra note 64 and accompanying
text.
63
The patient’s mother had signed a consent form allowing the administration
of the vaccine, which made no mention of any of the risks of the vaccine. Reyes, 498
F.2d at 1270. Nor did she receive any information about risks directly from the nurse
administering the injection. Id. at 1270-71.
64
Although the Reyes court held that the registered nurse who administered the
57
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administered outside the context of a doctor–patient relationship
and there is thus no opportunity for individualized consideration of
whether the vaccine is appropriate for the patient.
2.

Oral Contraceptives

A second exception, recognized only by a minority of
jurisdictions, is the oral contraceptive exception. This exception is
grounded in part on an extension of the reasoning in the mass
vaccine cases. In those cases, the exception was justified on the
grounds that a physician does not act as an intermediary between the
65
patient and the vaccine manufacturer. In the contraceptive cases,
plaintiffs similarly argue that although physicians must be consulted
in order to obtain the drug in question, they do not in fact play their
traditional role of advisor and decision maker, but are much more
likely to simply defer to the wishes of the patient and prescribe the
66
drug.
The contraception exception was articulated by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1985 in the case of MacDonald v.
67
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. The plaintiff in MacDonald was prescribed

polio vaccine was not a learned intermediary, some courts have held that, in certain
circumstances, a non-physician health care worker can perform the function of a
learned intermediary. See Rohrbough v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 470, 478
(N.D. W. Va. 1989) (holding that nurse who administered DPT vaccine in public
clinic was learned intermediary since she discussed medication with patient and
made considered medical judgment before administering vaccine); Walker v. Merck
& Co., 648 F. Supp. 931, 934 (M.D. Ga. 1986), aff’d without opinion, 831 F.2d 1069
(11th Cir. 1987); Singleton v. Airco, Inc., 314 S.E.2d 680, 682 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that nurse anesthetist qualified as learned intermediary because she was
familiar with side effects of medication); Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. Co. v. Medrano, 28
S.W.3d 87, 93 (Tex. App. 2000) (holding, inter alia, that nurses as well as doctors can
be learned intermediaries for purposes of the doctrine). If a non-physician health
care worker has the appropriate training to evaluate the warning and make a medical
judgment as to the effectiveness and desirability of the treatment for the particular
patient before her, she should be considered an effective intermediary, because the
policies behind the Rule will be advanced by applying the Rule in that setting. That
determination, however, should not be made lightly. The Rule should only be
applied after a full consideration of the status and relevant training of the health
care worker and after proper exercise of individualized medical judgment by that
health care worker on behalf of the patient.
65
See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
66
See, e.g., Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379, 380 (E.D. Mich.
1985). But see Allen v. Searle, 708 F. Supp. 1142, 1147-48 (D. Or. 1989) (holding that
learned intermediary rule would apply to an intrauterine contraceptive device
(“IUD”) because of participation of prescribing physician in selection and insertion
of device, despite the “greater degree of patient participation” in the decision to use
the device).
67
475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985).
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oral contraceptives by her physician and later suffered a stroke. She
alleged that the stroke was caused by blood clotting, a known side
69
effect of the contraceptive. Although the manufacturer’s warning
material, which described the potential for abnormal blood clotting
and brain damage, was provided to the patient, it did not mention
70
the word “stroke.” A jury agreed that this omission rendered the
product unreasonably dangerous and returned a verdict for the
71
plaintiff and against the manufacturer. The trial judge, however,
granted defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict based on the learned intermediary rule’s exemption of drug
72
manufacturers from the duty to warn the patient directly.
On appeal, the manufacturer argued that Massachusetts should
accept the reasoning of other jurisdictions that had applied the
73
learned intermediary rule to prescription contraceptives.
The
Supreme Judicial Court, however, identified several characteristics of
contraceptives that, it concluded, justified the creation of an
exception to the learned intermediary rule. These included: the
active involvement of the patient in the decision to use the drug; the
relatively passive role of the physician; the status of “the pill” as “a
74
convenience, rather than a traditional medication”; the relative lack
of post-prescription involvement by the physician; and the existence
75
of FDA regulations requiring direct warnings to the patient. The
court concluded that the learned intermediary rule should be
abrogated for oral contraceptive drugs and that the manufacturer’s
duty to deliver a legally adequate warning runs directly to the patient.
This exception stretches the mass vaccine rationale. The most
significant change is that, in the typical oral contraceptive fact
pattern, the drug is actually dispensed within the context of a doctor–
76
patient relationship. Despite this, the other factors identified by the
68

Id. at 67.
Id. at 67 n.4.
70
Id. at 67.
71
Id. at 68.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 69 n.10 (quoting Statement of American Medical
Association in March 14, 1970 issue of Science News, quoted in Comment, Liability of
Birth Control Pill Manufacturers, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1526, 1532 (1972))).
75
Id. at 69. For further discussion of the relationship between the FDA mandate
and the learned intermediary rule, and the current debate over preemption in this
context, see infra Part III.D.
76
See Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379, 380 (E.D. Mich. 1985);
Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 609 F.Supp. 867, 874-75 (E.D. Mich. 1985);
Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Wis. 1981); MacDonald,
69
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MacDonald court, such as increased patient involvement in the
treatment decision-making process and the relatively passive role of
the physician, justify abrogation of the learned intermediary rule in
77
the contraceptive context. Since the rationale behind the learned
intermediary rule requires not only that the prescribing physician be
present, but that she also be in a position to act as an effective
intermediary between the patient and the drug manufacturer,
jurisdictions which have adopted this exception recognize that the
mere presence of a prescribing physician does not offer adequate
78
protection to the patient in the circumstances described above.
3.

FDA-Mandated Patient Warnings

Where the FDA requires specific information to be furnished to
79
the patient, in addition to the warnings furnished to the physician,
80
the learned intermediary rule may not apply. The leading case on
475 N.E.2d at 70.
77
Fewer courts have extended this exception to encompass contraceptive devices
such as IUDs. See, e.g., Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142, 1148 (D. Or.
1989) (declining to apply contraceptive exception in case involving a Cu-9
contraceptive device because “although a greater degree of patient participation may
be involved in the choice of a prescription contraceptive than in some other
prescription drugs, the physician makes the ultimate decision as to whether a
particular contraceptive requested by the patient is appropriate”). In cases where
courts have been willing to make this extension, the rationale for the exception is the
same—the fact that the patient makes the decision to use the product, the fact that
the product is not being used in a medical context but rather for the patient’s
convenience, and the fact that there is essentially no significant follow-up care by the
physician, are held to justify abrogation of the learned intermediary rule.
78
See supra note 77. It may be true that in cases of surgically implantable devices,
the physician assumes the role of an intermediary; however, to the extent that the
Allen court and other courts refuse to recognize an exception because of the mere
presence of a physician in the chain of distribution, this is inadequate reasoning. See
Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. Co. v. Medrano, 28 S.W.3d 87, 92 (Tex. App. 2000) (refusing to
recognize exception for prescription contraceptives “even when a physician makes
no individualized judgment in prescribing and administering a prescription drug”).
79
In the 1980s, there was a brief move toward requiring patient warnings for all
prescription drugs. Although that initiative was rescinded in 1982, patient package
inserts are still required for certain drugs. Drugs for which a patient package insert is
required include estrogens, 21 C.F.R. § 310.515 (2004), oral contraceptives, 21 C.F.R.
§ 310.501 (2004), and nicotine, Edwards v. Basel Pharms., 933 P.2d 298, 299-300
(Okla. 1997). Such inserts are required “only when there is a need to communicate
detailed risk information about a drug product or instructions for using the
product.”
Labeling Requirements for Systemic Antibacterial Drug Products
Intended for Human Use, 68 Fed. Reg. 6062, 6072 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at
21 C.F.R. pt. 201).
80
See, e.g., Alexander v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, 98 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1286 n.10
(N.D. Okla. 2000); Hatfield v. Sandoz-Wander, Inc., 464 N.E.2d 1105 (Ill. App. Ct.
1984); McKee v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045 (Wash. 1989). Contra In re
Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Litig., 165 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that,
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81

this exception is Edwards v. Basel Pharmaceuticals.
In Edwards, the widow of a long-time smoker brought an action
against the manufacturer of a nicotine patch that had been
82
prescribed to her husband. The plaintiff’s husband had died from a
heart attack resulting from a nicotine overdose incurred from using
83
the product while still smoking.
Although the manufacturer
specifically warned the prescribing physician of the risk of death by
overdose if the patient smoked cigarettes while using the patch, the
warning provided by the manufacturer to the patient only stated, “an
84
overdose might cause you to faint.” The manufacturer argued that
it had satisfied both its tort duty to warn the prescribing physician
under the learned intermediary rule and its separate duty, imposed
85
by the FDA, to directly warn the patient. After the district court
86
granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the issue
framed for the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
87
was the effect of FDA approval of a patient warning on that
88
warning’s adequacy under principles of tort law.
The Edwards court noted that there are two lines of cases on the
issue of the relationship between FDA regulation and tort regulation
of the adequacy of a patient warning. Under one line of cases, the
FDA mandate eliminates the learned intermediary rule from the
analysis, and state tort principles are used to determine the adequacy
89
of the warning. Under the second line of cases, the FDA mandate
merely carves out an exception to the learned intermediary rule as
90
delineated by the specific mandate. Only under the first line of
under Texas law, existence of FDA-mandated patient warning would not preclude
application of learned intermediary rule).
81
Edwards v. Basel Pharms., 116 F.3d 1341 (10th Cir. 1997).
82
Id. at 1342.
83
The deceased was actually wearing two nicotine patches, and smoking a
cigarette, at the time of his fatal heart attack. Id.
84
Id.
85
The content of the warning given by Basel Pharmaceuticals to the patient,
although alleged to be defective by plaintiff due to its failure to disclose the risk of
death from an overdose of nicotine, had been approved by the FDA. Id.
86
Id.
87
Although no evidence was actually adduced that the FDA had in fact approved
the content of Basel’s patient warning, the allegation of FDA approval was
uncontested and so taken as true by the Tenth Circuit and the Oklahoma Supreme
Court. See Edwards, 116 F.3d at 1343 n.1; Edwards v. Basel Pharms., 933 P.2d 298,
299-300 (Okla. 1997).
88
Edwards, 116 F.3d at 1343.
89
See, e.g., MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 69-70 (Mass. 1985);
McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 532-35 (Or. 1974).
90
See, e.g., Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1032 (D.N.J. 1988);
Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 567 A.2d 398, 399 (Del. 1989).
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cases—the stronger version of the exception—would a court engage
in independent analysis of the adequacy of the FDA-mandated
warning. Under the second, weaker version, only failure to deliver
91
the specific FDA-mandated text would result in tort liability.
Since the tort standard is a matter of state law, and since the
issue was one of first impression in Oklahoma, the Tenth Circuit
certified the question of which version of the exception to use to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court for an advisory opinion regarding
92
Oklahoma law. The Oklahoma court held that the strong exception
should apply, and that compliance with a specific FDA mandate does
not preclude examination of the adequacy of the warning under state
93
tort law principles. This is the position taken by the reporters of the
Third Restatement as well, who state in the comments to section 6:
“[The Third Restatement] recognize[s] common-law causes of action
for defective drug design and for failure to provide reasonable
instructions or warnings, even though the manufacturer complied
94
with governmental standards.”
The justification for the FDA-mandate exception is on its face
somewhat different than either the mass vaccine or oral contraceptive
exception. On closer examination, however, they are related. Under
the strong version of the FDA exception, unlike the mass vaccine
exception, the context in which the drug is prescribed does not enter
into the analysis. The principal justification for the exception seems
91

In 1993, I argued that compliance with an FDA mandate should not preempt
analysis of the adequacy of a warning under state tort law—a position consistent with
the first line of cases. See generally Timothy S. Hall, Bypassing the Learned Intermediary:
Potential Liability for Failure to Warn in Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising, 2
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 449, 466-73 (1993) [hereinafter Hall, Bypassing]. I
continue to believe that independent review of the adequacy of warnings is the better
analysis. This is consistent with the approach taken by the Third Restatement, which
concludes that “a product’s compliance with an applicable product safety statute or
administrative regulation is properly considered in determining whether the product
is defective . . . but such compliance does not preclude as a matter of law a finding of
product defect.” THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 4(b). For more on the
preemption debate, see infra Part III.D.
92
Edwards, 116 F.3d at 1343.
93
Edwards v. Basel Pharms., 933 P.2d 298, 303 (Okla. 1997). Although the
Oklahoma Supreme Court spoke in terms of whether compliance with the FDA
mandate “reinstates” the Rule, id. at 301-03, this is not quite accurate. The issue is
not whether the learned intermediary rule is “reinstated,” but whether the Rule
exempts the manufacturer from state tort analysis of the quality and content of the
warning provided to the patient.
94
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 6 cmt. b. Furthermore, section 4 of the
Third Restatement provides: “[A] product’s compliance with an applicable . . .
regulation is properly considered in determining whether the product is
defective . . . but such compliance does not preclude as a matter of law a finding of
product defect.” Id. § 4(b).
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to be that, since the FDA has made an independent decision that
direct warnings to the patient are (for whatever reason) necessary,
tort law should act to regulate the content of those warnings. Thus,
the existence of the FDA mandate itself is enough to trigger the
exception to the learned intermediary rule and an independent
examination of the content of the patient warning.
In order to appreciate the relationship between the exceptions,
one must consider the FDA’s decision to mandate direct warnings to
patients for particular categories of prescription drugs. To the extent
that the rationales for the FDA’s decision to mandate direct warnings
to patients mirror the justifications used in the mass vaccine or oral
contraceptive cases, the courts in applying this exception are simply
deferring to the FDA’s judgment that, in these cases, there is
sufficient risk that the physician in the doctor–patient relationship is
not an effective intermediary.
4.

Direct-to-Consumer Advertising

The final exception to the learned intermediary rule has been
95
argued largely in theory, with only one court to date adopting it as a
96
matter of positive law. The direct-to-consumer (“DTC”) advertising
exception holds that the learned intermediary rule should not apply
when a plaintiff is led to seek a prescription for the drug by direct-toconsumer advertising sponsored by the drug manufacturer.
Proponents of this exception argue that by inserting itself into the
medical decision-making process, formerly the sole province of the
doctor and patient, the drug manufacturer is detracting from the
97
authority of the physician as intermediary. The proponents further
95

See generally Mitchell S. Berger, A Tale of Six Implants: The Perez v. Wyeth
Laboratories Norplant Case and the Applicability of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine to
Direct-to-Consumer Drug Promotion, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 525 (2000); Ozlem A. Bordes,
The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Direct-to-Consumer Advertising: Should the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Be Shielded from Liability?, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 267
(2004); April L. Foreman, Web of Manipulation: The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising on the World Wide Web, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 97 (2001);
Bradford B. Lear, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine in the Age of Direct Consumer
Advertising, 65 MO. L. REV. 1101 (2000); Patrick Cohoon, Comment, An Answer to the
Question Why the Time Has Come to Abrogate the Learned Intermediary Rule in the Case of
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 1333 (2001).
96
See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999).
97
This effect is noted in other areas of the law as well. See W.E. ‘Ted’ Afield,
Note, The New Drug Buyer: The Changing Definition of the Consumer for Antitrust
Enforcement in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 203, 209-10
(arguing that for purposes of defining the “consumer” of prescription drugs in
antitrust cases, DTC advertising undermines traditional view that prescribing
physician is the consumer).
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contend that, by voluntarily assuming the role of provider of
information regarding the drug, the manufacturer should also
assume the legal duty to provide an adequate warning about the
98
dangers of the drug. In 1995, users of the contraceptive implant
known as Norplant sued the manufacturer, alleging harm arising
from side effects of the medication as well as difficulties in removing
99
the implants. Although a prescription contraceptive, Norplant had
been extensively marketed directly to consumers as a more
100
convenient alternative to daily-dose oral contraceptives.
However,
the advertisements, although in compliance with FDA rules
101
governing direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs, did
not mention the potential for pain and scarring associated with the
102
removal of the device.
Wyeth Laboratories, the manufacturer of Norplant, argued that
the warnings of the risk of such adverse effects given to the plaintiffs’
physicians should preclude liability under the learned intermediary
rule. In 1999, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that that
state’s learned intermediary doctrine did not apply to drugs which
103
were marketed directly to consumers.
The court held that drug
manufacturers that advertised to consumers directly were legally
required to provide an “adequate warning of the product’s dangerous
104
propensities,” and that compliance with FDA guidelines on directto-consumer marketing of prescription drugs created a prima facie
105
presumption that such a warning had been given.
While the New
98

Foreman, supra note 95, at 114 (“[T]he drug manufacturer has advertised itself
into the role of the Learned Intermediary, and must accept responsibility of warning
the end consumer.”); Lear, supra note 95, at 1115 (under the learned intermediary
rule, “drug manufacturers can hide behind the learned intermediary doctrine and
continue to present information regarding the benefits of their products without
being required to inform the consumer of the risks”).
99
Perez, 734 A.2d at 1248.
100
Id.
101
A full discussion of the regulation of direct-to-consumer advertisement of
prescription drugs is outside the scope of this Article. Commentators have argued
that existing FDA regulation of direct-to-consumer advertising in fact does not
adequately protect consumers of prescription drugs. For more on this subject, see
Timothy S. Hall, The Promise and Peril of Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Promotion
on the Internet, 7 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Hall, Promise and
Peril].
102
Perez, 734 A.2d at 1248.
103
Id. at 1254-57.
104
Id. at 1257.
105
Id. at 1257-59. Although this ruling is at least consistent with the holding in
Edwards—that compliance with an FDA-mandated warning does not wholly preempt
application of state tort law to determine the adequacy of a warning—it in fact
provides the manufacturer a substantial shield from liability. Because of the lack of
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Jersey Supreme Court in Perez was the first court to adopt a DTC
106
exception to the learned intermediary rule, other jurisdictions have
107
not followed New Jersey’s lead, nor have there been further
reported cases in New Jersey alleging injury from failure to warn in
DTC advertisements.
The Perez case involved a nexus between the DTC and
108
contraception exceptions to the learned intermediary rule.
The
outcome in Perez could thus be read as merely another contraception
case. The Perez court, however, clearly did not intend it that way and
explicitly declined to analyze the case in the context of other cases
creating an exception to the learned intermediary rule for
109
prescription contraceptives. In a subsequent Norplant class action,
a federal district court analyzed the learned intermediary rules of all
fifty states and agreed that the DTC exception articulated by the New
Jersey court was not the same as the contraceptive exception
articulated by the Massachusetts courts. In the Norplant class action,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas held
that, as a matter of choice of law doctrine, the Massachusetts rule
would not prohibit the application of the learned intermediary rule
110
to Norplant cases governed by Massachusetts law.
The Perez case identified several theoretical justifications for a
DTC exception to the learned intermediary rule. These include:
litigation on point, it is not clear what evidence would suffice to overcome the
presumption that compliance with FDA regulations satisfies the duty to warn. This
issue will be important in determining the viability of future failure-to-warn claims
based on direct-to-consumer advertising. In fact, the reason for the lack of
subsequent litigation alleging direct-to-consumer advertising as an exception to the
learned intermediary rule may be the perceived strength of the presumption that
compliance with FDA regulations satisfies the tort duty as well. See THIRD
RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 4(b) (providing that compliance with regulatory
requirements should not preclude finding that a product is defective).
106
Although the Perez court was the first to hold that a DTC exception exists, the
first suggestion of such an exception by a court appears to have come eight years
earlier. In 1991, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
noted in a footnote that “[i]n an appropriate case, the advertising of a prescription
drug to the consuming public may constitute a third exception to the learned
intermediary rule. By advertising directly to the consuming public, the manufacturer
bypasses the traditional physician–patient relationship, thus lessening the role of the
‘learned intermediary.’” Garside v. Osco Drugs, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 208, 211 n.4 (D.
Mass. 1991). Despite the Garside court’s recognition in dicta of the theoretical
grounds for such an exception, that case did not involve DTC advertising, so the
learned intermediary rule was held to apply. Id.
107
See In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 215 F. Supp. 2d 795, 806-12
(E.D. Tex. 2002) (providing summary of state laws regarding this exception).
108
See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1247.
109
Id. at 1256.
110
Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 215 F. Supp. 2d at 810-11.
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1. The drug manufacturer, having undertaken to provide
information about the drug to the consumer, should have the
corresponding duty to ensure that the information provided is
111
complete and accurate.
2. Abolition of the learned intermediary rule in cases of DTC
advertising recognizes the increasing importance of the patient’s role
in choosing medical treatment rather than having it chosen for him
112
by the physician.
3. Abolition of the Rule recognizes that DTC advertising, by
providing information directly to the patient, “encroaches on [the
doctor–patient] relationship by encouraging consumers to ask for
113
advertised products by name.”
In addition, advertising of
prescription drugs aimed directly at the consumer may create the
mistaken impression in the mind of the consumer that the products
114
are safe or that the FDA has approved the advertisement.
The existing exceptions to the learned intermediary rule fail to
adequately give effect to the purposes behind the Rule. By merely
establishing categories of exceptions to the blanket exemption from
115
the duty to warn the end user, the Rule fails to adequately address
the rapid pace of change in the modern health care marketplace.
When combined with judicial reluctance to embrace new exceptions,
this creates a market distortion in which drug manufacturers have the
ability and resources to communicate effectively with end users, but
are not given legal incentives to do so in a responsible manner.
C. The Learned Intermediary Rule as a Blanket Exemption
The learned intermediary rule is properly thought of as an
111

Perez, 734 A.2d at 1257 (“When a patient is the target of direct marketing, one
would think, at a minimum, that the law would require that the patient not be
misinformed about the product.”).
112
Id. at 1256-57 (“Patient choice is an increasingly important part of our medicallegal jurisprudence.”).
113
Id. at 1256 (quoting Susan A. Casey, Comment, Laying an Old Doctrine to Rest:
Challenging the Wisdom of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
931, 956 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
114
See supra note 111; see also Michelle Andrews, Money & Medicine: Risky Turn on
Madison Avenue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2003, at 9 (discussing advertisements for medical
devices, and noting that “Consumers, accustomed to the Food & Drug
Administration’s rigorous approval process for drugs, may assume that the same
applies to medical devices. It doesn’t. . . . In the absence of clinical trials data,
people don’t have the information they need to evaluate whether one product is
better than others”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
115
See, e.g., Kennedy v. Merck & Co., Inc., No. 19591, 2003 WL 21658613, at *5
(Ohio Ct. App. July 3, 2004) (“Absent a recognized exception, [the] learned
intermediary doctrine controls this case . . . .”).
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exception to the general rule of law that product warnings, to be
116
legally effective, must be given to the end user of a product. This
exception, in keeping with its rationale, should apply only when an
117
effective intermediary exists.
As currently implemented by the
courts, however, the learned intermediary rule constitutes a blanket
exemption from a duty to warn the consumer of a prescription drug
of the potential dangers of the drug. The vast majority of courts
118
apply a virtually irrebuttable presumption that, absent one of a few
narrowly drawn exceptions, an effective intermediary exists. Courts
generally do not engage in an analysis of the facts of each case to
119
determine whether the Rule should apply.
A few plaintiffs have challenged this conception of the Rule and
have argued that courts should engage in fact-specific reasoning in
determining whether the learned intermediary rule should apply, but
120
have met with little success. In Swayze v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant drug manufacturer should have
known that there was a pervasive practice in Mississippi by which
physicians in fact did not exercise independent medical judgment in
making drug-prescription decisions with respect to a certain narcotic
anesthetic, and that this drug was in fact administered without
121
adequate supervision by licensed medical professionals. The court
dismissed the plaintiff’s concerns, as well as plaintiff’s analogy to non122
pharmaceutical case law, holding that the classification of the drug
116

See Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy, 764 N.E.2d 814, 820 (Mass. 2002) (observing that
the Rule “is an exception to the general rule that a manufacturer or retailer of an
unavoidably dangerous product must directly warn all foreseeable consumers of the
dangers of its product”); Edwards v. Basel Pharms., 933 P.2d 298 (Okla. 1999).
117
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
118
In fact, this presumption most often goes undiscussed by courts, most of which
do not even recognize the possibility of the absence of an effective intermediary. See,
e.g., Hall v. Elkins SINN, Inc., No. 03-31030, 2004 WL 1418787, at *3 (5th Cir. June
22, 2004) (per curiam) (“[T]he ‘learned intermediary doctrine’ applies in this case,
because it involves a prescription drug.”). Note that the possibility of a lack of an
effective intermediary is at least recognized by the Third Restatement. See infra notes
139-143 and accompanying text.
119
Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 2002-SC-0746-CL, 2004 WL 1361954, at *10 (Ky. June
17, 2004) (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting) (expressing belief that learned
intermediary rule “provides a type of summary immunization for pharmaceutical
manufacturers and makes the adequacy of warnings to the ultimate consumer a
question of law for the court and not a question of fact for the jury”).
120
807 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1987).
121
Id. at 470. The drug in question was a surgical anesthetic, which plaintiff
alleged was administered by medical technicians without adequate training, thus
giving rise to plaintiff’s injury. See id. at 465, 471.
122
Plaintiff made reference to Gordon v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, 574 F.2d
1182 (5th Cir. 1978), in which the court held that a warning given to plaintiff’s
employer was inadequate, and that the warning should have been given to individual
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as a prescription drug controlled, and that as a result, plaintiff had
not raised any material issue of fact sufficient to overcome a motion
123
for summary judgment.
The plaintiff also attempted to overcome the presumption that a
warning to the prescribing physician was adequate in Bacardi v.
124
In Bacardi, the plaintiff argued that summary judgment
Holtzman.
as a matter of law was inappropriate because factual issues still
remained regarding the manner in which he gained access to the
drug (namely, outside of a physician–patient relationship). The
Bacardi court stated, “It is the general rule that in the case of
prescription drugs warnings of potential adverse effects to the
125
prescribing physician is [sic] sufficient.”
The court rejected
plaintiff’s appeal from the grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendant, holding that only in cases falling within a recognized
exception to the learned intermediary rule would concerns about the
126
lack of a physician–patient relationship be heard.
Another excellent example of the approach taken by courts to
127
the learned intermediary rule is Vitanza v. Upjohn Co.
In Vitanza,
plaintiff’s decedent was a 34-year-old male with a history of allergies
to aspirin and non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, who died after
128
taking a tablet of Ansaid.
Although the drug had not been
129
prescribed for him, but for his wife, Mr. Vitanza, knowing of his
allergy, attempted to ascertain whether the drug was safe for him to
take. After examining the drug’s packaging, as well as reference
materials, and finding no express statement warning him against
130
taking the drug, he took one tablet and died several hours later of a
131
severe allergic reaction.
Vitanza’s widow sued Upjohn, the manufacturer of the drug,
operators of the machinery in question. Swayze, 807 F.2d at 471 (citing Gordon, 574
F.2d at 1192). This supports the thesis that courts apply different analyses in
prescription drug cases than in other cases involving intermediaries, and that the
analysis in the prescription drug cases is far more conclusory than that applied in
other industries.
123
Swayze, 807 F.2d at 469.
124
442 A.2d 617 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981).
125
Id. at 619; see also Stanback v. Parke, Davis & Co., 657 F.2d 642, 644 (4th Cir.
1981) (“[T]he duty an ethical drug manufacturer owes to the consumer is to warn
only physicians . . . .”).
126
Bacardi, 442 A.2d at 620.
127
271 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2001).
128
Id. at 91. Ansaid is prescribed to treat arthritis. Id. at 90.
129
Id.
130
Perhaps Mr. Vitanza should have realized that the name of the drug, Ansaid,
“is an acronym for A Non Steroidal Anti Inflammatory Drug.” Id.
131
Id. at 91.
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alleging that the failure to label the drug as a non-steroidal antiinflammatory drug (“NSAID”) constituted a failure to warn,
132
rendering the drug unreasonably dangerous.
Upjohn, moving for
summary judgment, asserted the learned intermediary rule as a
defense, claiming that its warning to prescribing physicians of the
nature of the drug discharged its duty, and that it owed no duty to
133
Vitanza argued that the learned intermediary rule
warn Vitanza.
should no longer be applied automatically, but instead should trigger
134
an inquiry into whether in fact an effective intermediary existed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit initially
expressed some doubt about whether Connecticut law would
recognize the learned intermediary rule as a defense as a matter of
135
law. The court noted that Connecticut’s recently adopted Products
Liability Act might give support to Vitanza’s argument, and that
recent changes in the health care marketplace might justify a more
fact-based approach to the Rule. The Second Circuit therefore
certified to the Connecticut Supreme Court the question of whether
the learned intermediary rule should bar Vitanza’s claim as a matter
136
of law.
The Connecticut Supreme Court soundly affirmed the
137
traditional approach to the learned intermediary rule, holding that
no fact-based inquiry was needed to grant Upjohn’s motion for
summary judgment and that Vitanza’s claim was barred as a matter of
law. In reaching this conclusion, the court merely repeated the
boilerplate defenses of the Rule, including the legal requirement of a
prescription to obtain the drugs. The court expressly approved of
the use of categorical exceptions to take account of changes in the
prescription drug marketplace.
The treatment of the learned intermediary rule as a bright-line
exception was perhaps justifiable in 1966, when the rule was first
articulated. At that time, the health care market was simpler, and a
paternalistic doctor–patient relationship was more firmly established
as the dominant paradigm of health care delivery. Today’s health
care system, however, no longer permits the unexamined
132

Id.
Id.
134
Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 214 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 2000).
135
Id. at 78-79.
136
Id. at 74.
137
Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829, 847 (Conn. 2001) (“[W]e see no reason
to create an entirely new exception on the facts of the present case, where the
traditional doctor–patient relationship existed, there were no communication
problems, and adequate warnings were provided to the prescribing physician.”).
133
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presumption that prescription drugs are dispensed in the context of
138
In contrast to courts’
an ideal doctor–patient relationship.
overwhelmingly reflexive and uncritical application of the Rule to
virtually all prescription drug cases, this Article proposes a more
nuanced application of the Rule that (1) recognizes that the Rule is
an exception to the primary doctrine that warnings run to the
ultimate consumer of a product; (2) takes into account developments
in the health care marketplace; and (3) establishes an approach
capable of adapting to future changes in the development, marketing
and use of prescription drugs.
D. The Third Restatement—A Step in the Right Direction
In 1998, the American Law Institute approved a new and
139
controversial revision of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
140
Liability. Although section 6(d) of the Third Restatement appears to
recognize the diminishing utility of the traditional learned
intermediary rule, ultimately, the Comments and Reporter’s Notes to
that section reveal that the Third Restatement continues to rely on
identification of categorical exceptions to the Rule rather than
revision of the Rule itself.
The approach of the Third Restatement to failure-to-warn claims
involving prescription drugs is contained in section 6, which provides
in pertinent part:
(d) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe
due to inadequate instructions or warnings if reasonable
instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm are
not provided to:
(1) prescribing and other health care providers who are in a
position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the
instructions or warnings; or
(2) the patient when the manufacturer knows or has reason
to know that health care providers will not be in a position
to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the
141
instructions or warnings.

The Third Restatement thus explicitly recognizes that in certain

138

See infra Part II (describing changes in the health care marketplace since
1966).
139
See generally Michael J. Wagner & Laura L. Peterson, The New Restatement (Third)
of Torts—Shelter from the Product Liability Storm for Pharmaceutical Companies and Medical
Device Manufacturers?, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 225 (1998).
140
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 6.
141
Id. § 6(d).

2004

LEARNED INTERMEDIARY RULE

221

circumstances, health care providers may not be in a position to act
as effective intermediaries. The approach of the Third Restatement,
however, is flawed in two respects. The first flaw is apparent from the
Comments and Reporter’s Note to section 6. Comment e, “Direct
Warnings to Patients,” makes reference to the existing mass vaccine,
FDA mandate, and DTC advertising exceptions. The Reporter’s Note
to comment e restates the vaccine exception and notes that “[t]he
Institute has left to developing case law whether other exceptions . . .
142
should be recognized.” Thus, although the language of subsection
(d)(2) itself could be read to support a case-by-case determination of
whether a learned intermediary exists, as proposed in this Article, this
is not borne out in the Comments or Reporter’s Notes, which
continue to espouse an analysis based on identification and
mechanical application of categorical exceptions.
Furthermore, despite the recognition in the Third Restatement
that in certain circumstances health care providers may not be in a
position to act as effective intermediaries, to date, few courts have
accepted this invitation to refine the learned intermediary rule to
143
reflect modern health care trends.
The time has come both to
recognize the changed health care marketplace and to move beyond
the categorical exception model which has characterized the learned
intermediary rule to date. In this proposed evolution of the Rule, it is
hoped that the Third Restatement’s treatment of the traditional Rule
will provide impetus for courts to further reconsider the learned
intermediary doctrine along the lines advanced in this Article.
E. The Sophisticated User Doctrine
1.

Description of the Doctrine

Drug companies are not the only product manufacturers that
sell products into a chain of distribution, rather than directly to end
users.
Although standard tort doctrine provides that a
142

Id. § 6 cmt. e, reporter’s note.
See, e.g., Pumphrey v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 334, 337-39 (N.D. W. Va.
1995) (holding that where manufacturer provided legally adequate warning of
dangers of medical device directly to physician, manufacturer had no further duty to
warn patient directly); Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 764 N.E.2d 35, 46 (Ill.
2002) (declining to apply standard from Third Restatement because it was not raised at
trial or appropriately briefed). Pumphrey cited to a provision in a tentative draft of
the Third Restatement. 906 F. Supp. at 338. See also Transue v. Aesthetech Corp., 341
F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 2003) (evaluating medical device claim under standards of Second
Restatement rather than Third Restatement); Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 2002-SC-0746-CL,
2004 WL 1361954 (Ky. June 17, 2004) (adopting Third Restatement version of learned
intermediary rule, but as a blanket exemption).
143
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manufacturer’s duty to warn extends through the chain of
144
the sophisticated user doctrine
distribution to the end user,
operates to relieve that duty in certain cases by reason of the
characteristics of a particular market.
The sophisticated user doctrine looks superficially like the
learned intermediary rule. As summarized in comment n to section
388 of the Second Restatement, under proper circumstances, an
adequate warning given to a third party, not the end user, will be
sufficient to discharge the manufacturer’s duty to warn despite the
fact that the warning was not in fact passed on to the end user by the
145
intermediary.
This rule is typically invoked in situations where
there is little communication, if any, between the manufacturer and
the end user of the goods, such as when component parts are
146
supplied for incorporation into a finished product,
or when
147
products are sold to an employer for use by its employees. In these
circumstances, the Second Restatement concludes, it is reasonable for
the manufacturer to rely on the intermediary to convey the warning
to the end user and the manufacturer should suffer no legal liability
148
for the intermediary’s failure to do so.
The similarity of the
circumstances involved in a sophisticated-user situation to the
144

See, e.g., SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 388 cmt. l (“The supplier’s duty
is to exercise reasonable care to inform those for whose use the article is supplied of
dangers which are peculiarly within his knowledge.”) (emphasis added).
145
Id. § 388 cmt. n.
146
See, e.g., Donahue v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 866 F.2d 1008 (8th Cir. 1989)
(odorizing agent added to propane used in residential hot water heater); Parker v.
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 909 P.2d 1, 7 (N.M. 1995) (component substances
of dental implants); see also Lee v. Butcher Boy, 215 Cal. Rptr. 195 (Ct. App. 1985)
(addressing issue of injury caused by defective motor used to power meat grinder);
infra note 150 (discussing the related “bulk seller doctrine”). Despite occasional
confusion by some courts, Union Carbide Corp. v. Kavanaugh, No. 4D03-2956, 2004 WL
1393537 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 23, 2004) (applying the sophisticated user defense
of § 388 but using the terminology of the learned intermediary rule), or litigants,
Bremer v. Egan Healthcare Corp., No. Civ.A. 03-1418, 2004 WL 1396314, at *4 (E.D. La.
June 21, 2004) (“As the walker in this litigation was dispensed to the plaintiff by
doctor prescription, the defendant argues that the learned intermediary or
sophisticated user doctrine applies.”), these are two distinct doctrines of law.
147
See, e.g., Swope v. Columbian Chems. Co., 281 F.3d 185, 205-11 (5th Cir. 2002)
(holding that manufacturer must establish that employer knew or reasonably should
have known of product’s dangers to trigger sophisticated user doctrine). The
sophisticated user doctrine is most often used in lawsuits by employees injured by
products sold to the employer in bulk, but has also been used in cases brought by the
retail purchaser of those products. See Richard C. Ausness, Learned Intermediaries and
Sophisticated Users: Encouraging the Use of Intermediaries to Transmit Product Safety
Information, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1185, 1220-21 (1996) (describing cases brought by
retail purchasers of products which were decided using the sophisticated user
doctrine).
148
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 388 cmt. n.
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tripartite relationship between a drug manufacturer, physician, and
patient is obvious. As the next section will demonstrate, however, the
details of the sophisticated user doctrine vary in material respects
from the learned intermediary rule.
2.

Sophisticated Users and Learned Intermediaries

Both the sophisticated user doctrine and the learned
intermediary rule allow the manufacturer of a dangerous product to
delegate to others the duty to warn the product’s end users of its
149
dangers.
Despite the superficial similarities, however, courts have
150
approached the two doctrines in very different ways.
A good example of the application of the sophisticated user
151
doctrine is found in Smith v. Walter C. Best, Inc.
In Smith, the
plaintiffs were employees of Valley Mould, which purchased sand
152
from defendant Walter C. Best, Inc.
In the course of their
employment, plaintiffs came into contact with the sand and

149

There are actually two “sophisticated user” issues in products liability law. The
first merely provides that there is no duty to warn of a risk of which the user of a
product is already aware. Therefore, courts have held that a “sophisticated user” who
is aware of the risks of a product cannot complain of the seller’s failure to deliver a
warning. See Matherne v. Poutrait-Morin/Zefal-Christophe, Todson, Inc., 868 So. 2d
114, 120-21 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (finding actual knowledge on part of plaintiff). The
second doctrine applies where, as discussed in this Article, a manufacturer sells a
product to a third party who makes the product available to end users. The issue in
these cases is to what extent the manufacturer can rely on the intermediary—the socalled “sophisticated user”—to deliver adequate warnings about the safe use of the
product. See. e.g., Mohr v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 674 N.W.2d 576, 584 (Wis.
Ct. App. 2003). It is this second doctrine which is the subject of this discussion. For
a discussion of potential jury confusion between the two doctrines, see Mozeke v.
International Paper Co., 933 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1991).
150
There is a third doctrine relevant to this discussion called the “bulk seller
doctrine.” Much like the learned intermediary and sophisticated user doctrines, the
bulk seller doctrine provides that when a manufacturer provides dangerous products
in bulk to a third party for repackaging and sale to end users, the manufacturer may
only warn the intermediary and is not required to ensure that a warning makes its
way to every end user. See, e.g., Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez, No. 01-0652,
2004 WL 2090592, at *1 (Tex. Sept. 17, 2004). However, courts have generally held
that, as with the sophisticated user doctrine and unlike the application of the learned
intermediary rule, the bulk seller doctrine only shields a manufacturer from liability
if the reliance on the intermediary was reasonable in the circumstances. See, e.g.,
Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 952 F.2d 841, 850-51 (5th Cir. 1992) (“The bulk seller,
therefore, fulfills its duty to the ultimate consumer only if it ascertains (1) that the
distributor to which it sells is adequately trained, (2) that the distributor is familiar
with the properties of the product and the safe methods of handling it, and (3) that
the distributor is capable of passing this knowledge to the consumer.”) (emphasis
added).
151
927 F.2d 736 (3d Cir. 1990).
152
Id. at 737-38.
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eventually developed silicosis, a respiratory disease. Plaintiffs sued,
alleging that their injuries were caused by defendants’ failure to
provide them with warnings of the dangerous nature of their
154
product.
The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants pursuant to the sophisticated user doctrine, and plaintiffs
155
appealed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reviewed the district court’s findings of fact and noted:
The district court focused on whether Valley Mould was a
knowledgeable purchaser of silica sand and upon whether the
sand suppliers failed to exercise reasonable care in relying upon
Valley Mould to provide appropriate employee warnings. The
[district] court [found] ample record evidence to support the
conclusion that Valley Mould was a knowledgeable industrial
purchaser of silica sand, familiar with the dangers associated with
inhaling silica dust and with proper dust control methods. The
court also concluded that Valley Mould was in a superior position
156
to supply effective employee warnings.

The contrast between the district court’s analysis of whether the
sophisticated user doctrine should insulate the manufacturer from
liability and the typical learned intermediary analysis could not be
more stark.
The sophisticated user analysis is a fact-based,
157
circumstance-sensitive inquiry
into the reasonableness of the
manufacturer’s behavior and the relationships among the
158
manufacturer, the intermediary, and the injured party. In contrast,
the typical learned intermediary case focuses solely on whether or not
159
the facts fit one or more predefined exceptions. The result is that
learned intermediary cases (i.e., prescription drug cases) tend to be
153

Id. at 738.
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 740.
157
See also Case v. Merck & Co., No. Civ. A. 02-1779, 2002 WL 31478219, at *5
(E.D. La. Nov. 5, 2002) (declining to grant summary judgment without specific
evidence as to whether an effective intermediary existed because “there [was] no
factual record before the Court upon which to base a finding that the vaccine
manufacturers were sophisticated users”).
158
This is the analysis contemplated by the Second Restatement. Comment n to
section 388 of the Second Restatement provides a set of factors for courts to apply in
deciding whether a manufacturer’s behavior was reasonable in the circumstances.
These include: (1) the degree of harm posed by the product; (2) the “known or
knowable character of” the intermediary relied on by the manufacturer; (3) the
burden which would be imposed on the manufacturer by requiring direct warnings;
and (4) the practicality of having the goods themselves carry the warning to the end
user. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 388 cmt. n.
159
See supra part I.C.
154
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disposed of by summary judgment while sophisticated user cases tend
to reach a jury for determination of the reasonableness of the
160
warning given.
The Reporters of the Third Restatement recognized the difference
between the application of the sophisticated user doctrine and the
learned intermediary rule. Unlike the learned intermediary rule,
they wrote that under the sophisticated user doctrine, “There is no
general rule as to whether one supplying a product for the use of
others through an intermediary has a duty to warn the ultimate
product user directly or may rely on the intermediary to relay
warnings.
The standard is one of reasonableness in the
161
circumstances.”
This is obviously very different from the learned
intermediary rule, which has developed as a bright-line rule of
exemption from the duty to warn the end user.
162
Recall the case of Vitanza v. Upjohn Co. In Vitanza, the Second
Circuit asked the Connecticut Supreme Court to decide the issue of
whether the learned intermediary rule was a bar to liability or a
163
defense to be considered by the fact finder. Although the Second
Circuit noted that Connecticut courts had in previous cases been
willing to treat the learned intermediary rule as a case-by-case
defense, in part due to “changed conditions in the health care
industry, including direct marketing . . . and increased patient
164
choice,” the Connecticut Supreme Court chose to reaffirm the
bright-line nature of the learned intermediary rule, concluding that
“[t]he learned intermediary doctrine stands for the proposition that,
as a matter of law, the prescribing physician . . . is the person best able
160

Compare Conwed Corp. v. Union Carbide Chems. and Plastics Co., Inc., 287 F.
Supp. 2d 993 (D. Minn. 2001) (denying summary judgment to manufacturer of
asbestos), and Natural Gas Odorizing, Inc. v. Downs, 685 N.E.2d 155 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997) (precluding summary judgment in favor of defendant due to fact issue as to
reasonableness of odorant supplier’s reliance on intermediary), with Wright ex rel.
Trust Co. of Kan. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming
grant of summary judgment in learned intermediary rule case).
161
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 2 cmt. i; see also SECOND RESTATEMENT,
supra note 18, § 388 cmt. n (“[I]t is obviously impossible to state in advance any set of
rules which will automatically determine in all cases whether one supplying a chattel
for the use of others through a third person has satisfied his duty . . . by informing
the third person of the dangerous nature of the chattel . . . .”); Hoffman v.
Houghton Chem. Corp., 751 N.E.2d 848, 856 (Mass. 2001) (“[I]n certain limited
circumstances, ‘a manufacturer may be absolved from blame [for failure to warn]
because of a justified reliance upon . . . a middleman,’ so long as such reliance is
reasonable.”) (quoting Carter v. Yardley & Co., 64 N.E.2d 693, 697 (Mass. 1946))
(emphasis added) (alterations in internal quotation in original).
162
271 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2001); see supra notes 127–37 and accompanying text.
163
See Vitanza v. Upjohn, 778 A.2d 829 (Conn. 2001).
164
Vitanza, 271 F.3d at 92.
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to take or recommend precautions against the harm.”
This
formula, which is accepted without question by a significant majority
of courts, encapsulates the difficulty with applying the Rule in the
context of the modern health care market.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY RULE
A. The Rule Fails to Reflect Modern Medical Practice
1.

Diminution of the Authority of the Physician

When the learned intermediary rule was first articulated, the
doctor–patient relationship was very different than the relationship
which exists today.
In 1966, physicians were substantially
autonomous in their role as medical advisors and decision makers for
166
A patient’s health insurer, if he had one, did not
their patients.
exercise any meaningful oversight over a physician’s spending or
practice patterns, and physicians were almost certainly paid on a feefor-service basis. In contrast, today, 78 million Americans under the
age of 65 receive health insurance and health care through some
167
form of managed care organization.
Managed care is defined by
the convergence of health insurance and the delivery of health
168
and is characterized by significant oversight of and
services,
169
limitation on the independent authority of the physician.
The
growth of managed care is explained in large part as a market
reaction in the 1970s and 1980s to the dramatic increases in the cost
165

Vitanza, 778 A.2d at 841 (emphasis added). Unfortunately, the Connecticut
court in Vitanza failed to take account of two things. First, the radical changes in the
health care marketplace since the articulation of the learned intermediary rule, and
second, the fact that the rule is in fact not, as the court stated “a rule of law stating a
duty,” id. at 840, but is rather an exception to the general rule that warnings are
owed to the end user of an unavoidably unsafe product. See supra note 116 and
accompanying text.
166
For an excellent discussion of the lack of meaningful communication in the
traditional, fee-for-service doctor–patient relationship, see JAY KATZ, THE SILENT
WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
167
NAT’L CENTER FOR HEALTH STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2003, WITH CHARTBOOK ON TRENDS IN THE HEALTH OF
AMERICANS 339 tbl.132, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/tables/2003/03hus132.pdf (last visited Oct. 13,
2004). For a more complete description of the managed care revolution and its
effect on the doctor–patient relationship, see Timothy S. Hall, Bargaining with
Hippocrates: Managed Care and the Doctor–Patient Relationship, 54 S.C. L. REV. 689
(2003) [hereinafter Hall, Bargaining with Hippocrates].
168
Hall, Bargaining with Hippocrates, supra note 167, at 692-94.
169
Id. at 694-99.
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of health care under a fee-for-service system, and one of the principal
goals of managed care has been to deliver medical services as
170
efficiently as possible.
Unfortunately, one of the casualties of this
drive for efficiency has been the quality of the physician–patient
interaction, as physicians are pressured by financial incentives to
171
perform more services in less time.
These circumstances allow
physicians little time to process warnings provided by drug
manufacturers into forms in which they will be heard, understood,
and heeded by patients. Although the physician still performs a
gatekeeping function, since even in the modern doctor–patient
relationship physicians can refuse to prescribe drugs that they believe
172
to be unhelpful or contraindicated, this gatekeeping function is less
concerned with patient education and empowerment than it is an
exercise of a physician’s clinical judgment. Simply put, the structure
of the modern doctor–patient relationship does not allow the
physician to occupy the ideal ethical role which underlies the learned
intermediary doctrine—that of collaborative decision making and
tailoring the technical warnings delivered by the drug company into a
form suitable for the patient.
Managed care is also characterized by increased control over the
doctor–patient relationship by third party payors.
In the
pharmaceutical context, managed care companies exert control over
drug choices in three ways: by use of pre-authorization requirements,
through use of formularies, and by using prescription benefit
managers (“PBMs”). Formularies are lists of covered drugs for which
the MCO will pay or which will be subject to lower co-payment and
deductible costs than non-formulary drugs. These formulary drugs
are often chosen, not solely on the basis of therapeutic benefit, but
also on the basis of cost discounts negotiated between the managed
173
care company and the manufacturer of the drug.
Prescription

170

Id. at 690. There is substantial debate, however, whether cost savings seen in
the early years of managed care penetration are sustainable, as medical cost increases
are once again far outpacing the level of inflation in the economy as a whole. Id. at
693.
171
For a more complete discussion of financial incentives in managed care, see
generally Timothy S. Hall, Third-Party Payor Conflicts of Interest in Managed Care: A
Proposal for Regulation Based on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 29 SETON HALL L.
REV. 95 (1998).
172
Today’s health care market, however, provides patients with opportunities to
obtain drugs even without their physicians’ consent. See infra Part II.A.4 (discussing
the rise of Internet pharmacies which will provide prescription drugs outside the
context of a doctor–patient relationship).
173
GEN. ACCT. OFF., PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFITS: IMPACT OF MEDICARE HMOS’
USE OF FORMULARIES ON BENEFICIARIES 5-6 (1999).
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benefit managers are firms employed to reduce the cost of
prescription drug coverage to MCOs, often through programs to
encourage the use of generic alternatives and cheaper drugs within
the same therapeutic class.
2.

Increased Importance of Drug Therapies

The twentieth century saw the greatest expansion of the
knowledge and power of medicine in history. Much of this expansion
came in the form of pharmaceutical therapies, resulting in more
effective treatments for scores of diseases. These advances in drug
therapies also fueled a dramatic increase in pharmaceutical
174
spending, and the resulting rise in prescription drug costs still
175
reverberates through American health policy debates.
It is no
exaggeration to say that drug therapies are now at the core of
American medical practice, and that few Americans leave a doctor’s
appointment without a prescription.
This increased emphasis on pharmacology in modern medicine,
however, also has its downside. With the increased efficacy of
modern medicines has come an increased demand for medication,
even in situations where the medication is contraindicated or
176
unhelpful.
This can be harmful both to the individual patient as
well as to the public health.
The literature is replete with
descriptions of overuse and misuse of antibiotic drugs, to the extent
that many microbial diseases once successfully treated with antibiotics
have developed resistance to the commonly used drugs, and are once
177
again spreading relatively unchecked.
Patient demand for drugs
can lead both to doctor-shopping and, more recently, to patients
obtaining medication themselves entirely outside the doctor–patient
relationship.

174

Thomas R. McLean & Edward P. Richards, Health Care’s “Thirty Years’ War”: The
Origins and Dissolution of Managed Care, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 283, 392 (2004)
(noting that spending on prescription drugs increased 300% from 1991 to 2001).
175
See H. Jeffrey Lawrence, M.D., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs: The Price of
Success?, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 165, 165-67 (2004).
176
See Murray et al., supra note 13, at 521 (reporting that physicians found fortynine percent of specific drug requests from patients to be clinically inappropriate).
177
See, e.g., Oliver T. Rutschmann & Marisa Elena Domino, Antibiotics for Upper
Respiratory Tract Infections in Ambulatory Practice in the United States, 1997-1999: Does
Physician Specialty Matter?, 17 J. AM. BOARD FAM. PRAC. 196 (2004); U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE, at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/hottopics/anti_resist.html (last visited Oct. 16,
2004).
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Increased Emphasis on “Lifestyle” Drugs

At the same time as advances in pharmaceutical science were
expanding the physician’s abilities to cure, drug companies were also
expanding into new markets and redefining the concepts of sickness
and of medical intervention. In 1998, Pfizer obtained FDA approval
for a new drug for the treatment of erectile dysfunction. The new
178
drug, Viagra, was a runaway bestseller for Pfizer and arguably
179
ushered in a new era of “lifestyle” drugs. While the application of
medical science to cosmetic enhancement is not new, the
development and use of so-called “lifestyle drugs” has boomed in the
180
past few years, and the onslaught of such products and therapies
181
shows no signs of abating.
The increased availability of “lifestyle” drugs has caused
problems for the health care system, raising questions about the
appropriateness of coverage for purportedly medically unnecessary
182
treatments. Particularly in light of the extremely high cost of many
prescription drugs and many needy individuals’ inability to pay for
medically necessary drugs, the ethics of spending millions of dollars
on the development, marketing, and sale of non-medically-necessary
therapies is debatable.
One might argue that the purchase of a “lifestyle” drug such as
Viagra shares several of the characteristics of previously recognized
exemptions to the learned intermediary rule, and that the Rule
should therefore simply not apply to such drugs. This analysis,
however, is overly simplistic and would be unworkable in practice.
178

See Viagra: $1 Billion in Sales Expected in First Year on the Market, CHI. TRIB., July
10, 1998, at C7; A Record Pace for Viagra Sales, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1998, at D6.
179
Although certainly some “lifestyle” products such as Rogaine pre-dated the
Viagra boom, it was Viagra that captured the imagination of the nation. A search of
the Nexis “major newspapers” database reveals 1,498 articles with “Viagra” in the title
during 1998, the year of its introduction.
180
See Visage in a Bottle—Bespoke Services Look to the Future, BRAND STRATEGY, May 12,
2003, at P6, available at 2003 WL 6282132.
181
See Jeffrey P. Kahn, Raising the Issue of Viagra Costs—Who Should Pay?, at
http://www.cnn.com/Health/bioethics/9807/viagra.cost/ (last visited Oct. 16,
2004) (“The future will likely offer many new drugs like Viagra: expensive drugs that
have lifestyle benefits without actually curing an illness or disease. . . . The case of
Viagra represents only the beginning of what will be more difficult decisions about
who pays for the promising treatments of the future.”).
182
See, e.g., State’s Authority over Drug Coverage Upheld, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 2003, at
B6 (describing disagreement between insurers and state officials over which drugs
are medically necessary and which are “nonessential”). For an overview of some of
the legal issues arising from the popularity of Viagra, see generally Kim H. Finley,
Comment, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Viagra? Demand for “Lifestyle” Drugs Raises
Legal and Public Policy Issues, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 837 (2000).
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Although it is true in many cases that such drugs are sought by the
patient—perhaps after exposure to direct-to-consumer advertising—
and that the physician may play a diminished role in the decision to
183
use the drug, this is not true of all prescriptions for any given
“lifestyle” drug. For example, while Viagra is certainly sought,
prescribed, and used for lifestyle, cosmetic, or “convenience”
purposes, it is also used for the treatment of organic erectile
184
dysfunction. In that latter context, it is far more likely that the drug
is being prescribed and used within the context of a doctor–patient
relationship, in which case the learned intermediary rule should
apply. This inability to clearly distinguish at first glance between
“lifestyle” applications and “medical” applications of drugs leads to
the conclusion that a categorical exception from the protections of
the learned intermediary rule for “lifestyle” drugs is inappropriate,
and that a more nuanced approach is required.
4.

Increased Availability of Alternate Outlets for
Prescription Drugs

One of the consequences of the Internet economy boom of the
1990s has been the rise of Internet-based pharmacy services. While
many of these online pharmacies are merely cyber-analogues of brick
and mortar pharmacies or cost-saving mail-order pharmacies run by
insurance companies, there are Internet pharmacies where
prescription drugs can be purchased outside of a doctor–patient
relationship. Some of these pharmacies employ licensed physicians
to write prescriptions, usually on the basis of an online questionnaire
filled out by the customer, while others provide prescription drugs
185
without any prescription. While such pharmacies are illegal under
current American drug and physician licensing laws, to date there
have been no significant efforts by the Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) or other regulatory bodies to crack down on such
operations. In fact, the international nature of the Internet may
make regulation of these “on-line” pharmacies virtually impossible, as
183

These characteristics are typically used by courts that recognize the oral
contraceptive exception. See supra Part I.B.2.
184
Another example of this difficulty in categorization occurs with cosmetic
surgery. For example, breast augmentation is considered a “lifestyle” treatment
rather than a medical treatment when used in a purely elective context despite the
fact that it can be used in other cases in a medically necessary fashion such as
reconstructive surgery after a mastectomy. There are virtually no so-called “lifestyle”
drugs or treatments which are not also used for sound medical reasons.
185
For a typology of Internet pharmacies, see Barbara J. Williams, Note, On-Line
Prescriptions and Drug Sales: An Overview of Emerging Issues, 1 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 147 (2001).
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sellers can readily set up shop beyond the jurisdiction of American
authorities. This is compounded by the fact that mailed packages of
186
prescription drugs are difficult to interdict at the border.
If the manufacturer of a prescription drug knows or should
know that the product will not be dispensed in the context of a
meaningful doctor–patient relationship, then there is already support
187
188
in the case law and in the Third Restatement for not applying the
learned intermediary rule. As early as 1974, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, applying Texas law, stated that a drug manufacturer would
be held to the knowledge of an expert in the “distribution and
189
administration of pharmaceutical products.”
The court further
stated that, in the context of the administration of the polio vaccine,
it was generally known that “a great majority of [people] receive
their . . . vaccine in mass administrations or county clinics manned at
190
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit
least in part by [non-physicians].”
concluded that the defendant would be presumed to have known
that vaccines sold to a state health department would likely be
191
administered in such a context.
The Third Restatement also
incorporates this principle in its statement that warnings should be
provided to the patient when a drug manufacturer knows or should
know that a drug is being sold in a situation where “health-care
providers will not be in a position to reduce the risks of harm in
192
accordance with the instructions or warnings.”
5.

Increased Marketing to the Patient as Decision Maker

In the past two decades, there has been a dramatic change in the
promotion of prescription drugs. In 1966, when the learned
intermediary rule was first articulated, prescription drugs were
marketed exclusively at physicians and other health care
193
professionals.
Since that time, marketing materials intended for
consumers have become the fastest growing segment of the
186

Letter from Representatives John D. Dingell and Peter Deutsch, to Dr. Mark
McLennan, FDA Commissioner (July 14, 2003) (describing inadequate interdiction
practices and procedures in the Louisville, Kentucky UPS facility), available at
http://www.house.gov/commerce_democrats/press/108ltr43.htm.
187
See Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).
188
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 6(d)(2).
189
Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1277.
190
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
191
Id. (citing Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968)).
192
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 6(d)(2).
193
For a more complete discussion of the phenomenon of direct-to-consumer
prescription drug promotion, see generally Hall, Bypassing, supra note 91; Hall,
Promise and Peril, supra note 101.
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194

pharmaceutical industry’s promotional budget. Direct-to-consumer
marketing is conducted through print and broadcast media and,
most recently, through the new medium of the Internet.
Although direct-to-consumer marketing is a fairly new
phenomenon, studies have shown it to be effective in establishing
brand name recognition and in creating demand for the advertised
195
product.
Direct-to-consumer advertising has been controversial,
largely because of perceptions on the part of consumer advocates and
others that advertisements do not present a fair balance of
promotional and instructional information about the product
196
advertised.
Opponents of direct-to-consumer advertising point to
numerous instances of misleading or inaccurate statements about
197
advertised products.
Despite criticism of direct-to-consumer advertising, such
promotional efforts are becoming accepted in the health care
marketplace. The FDA has not acted to significantly limit the ability
198
of drug manufacturers to engage in such advertising; and drug
manufacturers apparently find them a useful adjunct to the more
traditional promotional efforts directed at health care
199
professionals.
Some commentators recognize that direct-toconsumer advertisements have potential benefits, including increased
200
awareness on the part of patients of new or innovative treatments.
194

Direct-to-Consumer
Advertising
Jumps
185%
(Nov.
6,
2003),
at
http://www.pharmacist.com/articles/h_ts_0409.cfm (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
195
MARTA WOSINSKA, COMMENTS ON CONSUMER-DIRECTED PROMOTION, Docket No.
2003N-0344 (Dec. 1, 2003) (summarizing results of empirical research into the
effects of DTC advertising), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/dec03/120303/03N-0344-emc000017-01.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
196
Foreman, supra note 95, at 110-14 (describing and critiquing the content of
several promotional Web sites).
197
See, e.g., Jackie Judd, Truth in Advertising? FDA Says Many Prescription Drug Ads
are Deceptive, Jan. 3, 2001 (on file with author).
198
See Hall, Promise and Peril, supra note 101, at 3-8 (discussing history of FDA’s
regulation of direct-to-consumer advertising).
199
See Michael Pastore, Internet Pharmaceutical Ads Prove Effective, at
http://www.cyberatlas.internet.com/markets/advertising/article/0,1323,5941_2941
91,00.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2004) (reporting on study finding that Internet
advertising to consumers is more effective than traditional print or broadcast
advertisements); Ross Tieman, Keep Taking the Tablets—Brand Extensions, FIN. TIMES,
Apr. 16, 2003, at 2 (quoting Jo Pisani of consultants PricewaterhouseCoopers as
saying, “Increased consumer awareness will lead to more of a ‘pull’ for
pharmaceutical products by patients, requesting drugs by name, rather than
traditional ‘push’ model driven by the pharma sales force.”), available at 2003 WL
17852987.
200
STATEMENT OF NANCY M. OSTROVE, PH.D., DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DIV. OF DRUG
MKTG., ADVER. & COMMUNICATIONS, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BEFORE THE
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Direct-to-consumer advertisements have the potential to help patients
become more educated partners in making their own health care
decisions and more likely to follow through with their therapy.
Direct-to-consumer advertising thus may improve both the ethical
ideal of patient autonomy and the quality of health care outcomes.
In any event, the growth of direct-to-consumer advertising clearly
signals the recognition by drug manufacturers of the importance of
the consumer’s desires and brand awareness in the health care
201
decision-making process.
Similarly, the law must recognize the
expanded role of the consumer in the modern health care market.
Despite some judicial recognition of the increasingly important
role of the health care consumer, courts have generally not applied
the same insights to the application of the learned intermediary rule.
Only New Jersey has recognized an exception to the Rule for directto-consumer promotional activities. Even in New Jersey, however,
recognition of this exception has not resulted in subsequent litigation
202
seeking to hold drug manufacturers liable for failure to warn.
Some commentators have agreed with the New Jersey Supreme
Court that a categorical exception to the learned intermediary rule
203
for drugs advertised directly to consumers is appropriate.
Even
though the New Jersey Supreme Court is to be commended for its
recognition of the potential dangers of direct-to-consumer
advertising, its approach to the problem is less than optimal. New
Jersey requires that companies marketing prescription drugs to
204
consumers also provide legally adequate warnings to consumers,
SUBCOMM. ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS, FOREIGN COMMERCE, AND TOURISM, SENATE COMM.
ON SCI. & TRANSP. (July 24, 2001) (summarizing potential benefits of DTC
advertising), at http://www.fda.gov/ola/2001/drugpromo0724.html (last visited
Oct. 31, 2004); Hall, Promise and Peril supra note 101, at 25-31 (discussing the
potential benefits and detriments of direct to consumer advertising on the internet.
201
See Tieman, supra note 199, at 2 (observing that “increasingly-informed
consumers are also contributing to a shift in the way the pharmaceutical industry
regards its brands. Today, blockbuster drugs such as Prozac, for depression, or
Viagra, for impotence, have become household names. . . . Patients . . . can research
treatments from home on the internet . . . and confront their doctor with the fruits
of their research”).
202
See supra Part I.B.4.
203
George W. Evans & Arnold I. Friede, The Food and Drug Administration’s
Regulation of Prescription Drug Manufacturer Speech: A First Amendment Analysis, 58 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 365, 423 (2003) (“[B]ecause consumers are shielded by learned
intermediaries in the selection and use of prescription drugs, it is not essential for
DTC advertisements to outline what each and every particular risk of a drug might
be. . . . Concerning the drug at issue, doctors can be presumed to act responsibly
and with full information from the operative labeling before issuing consumers a
prescription.”).
204
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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effectively abrogating the learned intermediary rule for heavily
advertised drugs. The New Jersey Supreme Court did not establish
any procedure for determining whether or not the direct marketing
of the drug in fact undermined the existence of a learned
intermediary, relying instead on the establishment of a categorical
exception.
B. The Rule Reflects an Outdated Ethical View of the Doctor–Patient
Relationship
It is no exaggeration to say that the principle of informed
205
consent is the bedrock of modern medical ethics. In the past forty
years, increased attention to the informed consent doctrine has
sparked a revolution in society’s concept of the doctor–patient
relationship.
206
The Hippocratic Oath
stands as the paradigm of the
“traditional” paternalistic doctor–patient relationship. According to
the Hippocratic concept of this relationship, doctors should not
inform their patients of the nature of their illnesses or of the
therapies prescribed for them, as patients were thought to be
207
incapable of understanding the complexities of medical practice.
This approach, founded on the authority of the physician and the
compliance of the patient, has been almost completely replaced by
208
the principle, as articulated in Canterbury v. Spence, that “[e]very
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
209
Although widespread
what shall be done with his own body . . . .”
acceptance of this principle by both the law and the medical
profession was slow in arriving, patient autonomy is now virtually
universally recognized as an ethical goal—some say the primary
210
ethical goal—of modern American medical practice.
Both the principle of autonomy and the related informed
consent doctrine envision the patient as an empowered partner in
205

TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 77-80
(5th ed. 2001).
206
See
Nova
Online,
The
Hippocratic
Oath—Classical
Version,
at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/oath_classical.html (last visited Oct. 16,
2004).
207
See generally SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 22324 (1978) (noting absence of obligation of veracity in classical physicians’ oaths);
NHSS Tan, Deconstructing Paternalism, 43 SINGAPORE MED. J. 148, 148 (2002)
(discerning paternalism in original Hippocratic Oath).
208
464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
209
Id. at 780 (quoting Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 185 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y.
1914)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).
210
See BEACHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 205, at 77-80.
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making health care decisions.
As informed consent doctrine
becomes more robust and respect for patient autonomy is more fully
recognized in the law, the retention of a learned intermediary rule
which presupposes the patient’s near total reliance on the physician
will become increasingly out of touch with the ethical goals of
medicine. The law should provide incentives for the health care
system to more completely realize its aspirational goals and not
incentives to cut patients out of the decision-making process.
The law has begun to recognize the increased importance of the
211
patient in the health care decision-making process. In 1996, in the
context of a trademark infringement lawsuit filed by the Upjohn
Company against Wyeth-Ayerst, a rival maker of an estrogen
replacement therapy, a federal district court concluded that
“physicians, pharmacists and patients are the consumers relevant to
determining how likely it is that consumers will confuse” the two
212
products.
The court based its conclusion in large part on the
extensive efforts by the defendant to target its promotional campaign
toward potential patients, as well as by using the more traditional
213
avenue of advertising to physicians. The court noted that the likely
effect of such direct advertising was to enhance the role of the patient
in the health care decision-making process and that the
advertisements were designed to promote “alleged advantages to
which a lay person is likely to attach some significance: convenient
214
packaging, cost savings and the approval of the FDA.”
211

See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Sanchez, 280 F. Supp. 2d 590, 607 (W.D. Tex.
2003) (grounding the right to an abortion in, inter alia, principles of bodily
autonomy); Pekera v. Purpora, 836 A.2d 1253, 1256 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003) (ruling
that a physician was justified in declining to provide treatment because of his
patient’s informed refusal to consent to such treatment); Cohen v. Bolduc, 760
N.E.2d 714, 721 (Mass. 2002) (finding that a state statute authorizing medical care
proxies “ensures that a patient’s right of autonomy . . . is respected”); In re Bronx
Psychiatric Ctr., 728 N.Y.S.2d 10, 13 (App. Div. 2001) (protecting a patient’s right to
autonomy in an involuntary commitment case by appointment of counsel); In re
Duran, 769 A.2d 497, 504-05 (Pa. Super. 2001) (grounding the right to refuse a
blood transfusion in principles of autonomy).
212
Upjohn Co. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 1:95CV237, 1996 WL 33322175, at
*3 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 5, 1996) (emphasis added).
213
Id. at *11 (“While it is true that courts generally do not discuss patients as
relevant consumers for trademark purposes when the product is a [prescription
drug] requiring a prescription, . . . the marketing of PREMPRO differs from caselaw
precedent. . . . [D]efendant . . . has targeted directly existing . . . patients and
prospective . . . patients with . . . promotions.”).
214
Id. at *11-12 (“The parties do not dispute that patients as well as physicians and
pharmacists can come to recognize a prescription drug by its brand name. . . .
Simply because a patient cannot actually purchase PREMPRO without a prescription,
does not mean that a patient cannot seek [PREMPRO] from a physician.”). For facts
disputing the court’s assumption that a physician is necessarily required to purchase
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In the context of antitrust law, it is also important to properly
215
define the relevant market for a particular type of goods or services.
In this area as well, there has been movement towards including the
consumer in the relevant market definition, recognizing the
increasing importance of the consumer in the health care decision216
making process.
C. The Rule Establishes Improper Incentives for Drug Manufacturers
The learned intermediary rule has provided at least an indirect
incentive for drug manufacturers to employ direct-to-consumer
advertising and other devices to bypass the learned intermediary.
Because the courts treat the learned intermediary rule as a blanket
217
exception to liability for failure to directly warn the consumer, and
do not engage in a case-by-case inquiry as to whether a legally
sufficient intermediary actually exists, plaintiffs injured by industry
efforts to bypass the learned intermediary have no valid recourse.
The learned intermediary rule thus has the effect of creating market
218
distortions.
prescription drugs in today’s health care marketplace, see supra Part III.A.4, which
describes the rise of Internet pharmacies.
215
WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 3.2 (2004 ed.) (“[A] key
threshold element in a [Sherman Act] Section 2 case will ordinarily be the definition
of the ‘relevant market,’ meaning the particular group of products with which, and
geographic area within which, the defendant’s product or service effectively
competes and the effects of its monopolizing conduct are felt.”); Afield, supra note
97, at 205 (“In any antitrust analysis that involves a properly defined relevant market,
a plaintiff must establish a relevant geographic market and a relevant product market
in order to demonstrate that the defendant possesses market power.”).
216
See, e.g., Afield, supra note 97, at 207-14.
217
See supra Part I.C.
218
Unfortunately, such legally generated market distortions are not unknown to
health law. The most famous such phenomenon is, of course, the doctrine of ERISA
preemption under which managed care organizations, especially self-funded
managed care organizations, are exempt from much state regulation including state
tort liability. This has had the effect of insulating MCOs from the tort law
consequences of their cost containment policies and allegedly wrongful denials of
care. Although ERISA preemption in recent years has been considerably softened by
judicial interpretations, see generally Karen A. Jordan, Recent Modifications to the
Preemption Doctrine & Their Impact on State HMO Liability Laws, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV.
51 (2004), the insulation from tort liability afforded by the ERISA preemption
doctrine is largely responsible both for the meteoric rise of managed care as the
dominant health care delivery paradigm in the 1990s and for the recent managed
care backlash in the popular culture and health policy. See Karen A. Jordan, Coverage
Denials in ERISA Plans: Assessing the Federal Legislative Solution, 65 MO. L. REV. 405, 40608 (2000). Health law scholars have argued that the exemption from liability
granted to managed care organizations by early judicial interpretations of the ERISA
statute was partly responsible for the development of many questionable managed
care practices. These practices include providing primary care physicians with
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First, the current state of the law gives the drug industry a
perverse incentive to divert research and development dollars away
from development of medically necessary drugs to the development
of so-called “lifestyle drugs.” The industry has been criticized in
recent years for focusing on “lifestyle” drugs, because of their higher
profit margin, to the exclusion of medically necessary drugs, which
219
could save lives lost to disease in underdeveloped nations.
Furthermore, “lifestyle” drugs constitute many, though by no means
all, of the drugs that are most heavily marketed directly to consumers
220
in the United States, and consumer demand for these drugs is
rising to such an extent that funding for them may supplant other,
221
more medically useful drugs in pharmaceutical formularies. To the
extent that drug manufacturers are obtaining a “free ride” from
liability for lifestyle drugs demanded by consumers, their profits on
those drugs do not reflect the true cost of the product; and so tort law
should step in to rectify the situation. Lower profit margins on
lifestyle drugs might help to reduce the disparity between the
attractiveness of these drugs as compared to other, more socially
222
useful drugs.
Second, the exemption from liability created by the Rule for
overreaching financial incentives to limit the amount of care provided and severely
limiting physicians’ ability to independently control the care of their patients
through aggressive use of pre-authorization requirements. See Hall, Bargaining with
Hippocrates, supra note 167, at 699-705. The managed care literature, both scholarly
and popular, is replete with “horror stories” of injury and death caused by industry
practices and with allegations that ERISA preemption prevents tort law from
operating to curtail the depredations of the unfettered marketplace in a market
characterized by unequal knowledge, unequal bargaining power, and particularly
vulnerable consumers. Id.
219
James H. Flory & Philip Kitcher, Global Health and the Scientific Research Agenda,
32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 36 (2004), available at 2004 WL 69026590; Ralph Nader,
Corporate Supremacy & the Erosion of Democracy, 64 HUMANIST 7 (March 1, 2004),
available at 2004 WL 63557844; Amy Ellis Nutt, The Next Plague; Killer Bacteria Defeat
Toughest Antibiotic, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Jan. 4, 2004, at D1, available at 2004 WL
58532055.
220
David E. Dukes et al., What You Should Know About Direct-to-Consumer Advertising
of Prescription Drugs, 68 DEF. COUNS. J. 36, 37 (2001) (“DTC detractors note that most
pharmaceutical products promoted to consumers are ‘lifestyle’ drugs and that drugs
for more complex conditions and diseases receive less promotion.”).
221
Tamar V. Terzian, Note, Direct to Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising, 25 AM
J.L. & MED. 149, 160 (1999) (“Potential changes in formularies have raised concerns
that improving enrollee satisfaction by including requested drugs on formularies may
divert resources from other important areas.”).
222
But see David Brushwood, Responsive Regulation of Internet Pharmacy Practice, 10
ANN. HEALTH L. 75, 102 (2001) (“Mounting a . . . crusade against bad choices that
affect nobody other than the person making the choice could have the appearance
of economic protectionism, no matter how well intended as a public health
measure.”).
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information conveyed to consumers in advertisements, combined
with drug companies’ insulation from the economic effect of
increased drug spending on the health care economy as a whole,
creates a disproportionate incentive to advertise and thus increase
demand without due consideration of the relative value of the drug.
This increasing push on the part of drug companies to create
consumer demand for the latest drug, which often translates to the
most expensive drug, is beginning to create a backlash from
employers, insurers, and others who are concerned about the
223
dramatic rise in overall health care costs. Some go so far as to claim
that direct-to-consumer advertisements directly contribute to rising
224
drug costs.
A case-by-case approach would give drug companies an
additional incentive to take care in their promotional efforts and to
more carefully police the channels through which their drugs are
distributed. Since a manufacturer would have a defense to a claim
for failure to warn if in fact the patient had the benefit of a full
disclosure and consultation by a physician, drug companies would
naturally disfavor sales through Internet pharmacies that provide
prescriptions based on merely a checklist, with no face-to-face
225
interaction or physician–patient relationship.
223

See, e.g., Thomas M. Burton, Pushing Pills: Reining in Drug Advertising, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 13, 2002, at B1 (quoting General Motors executives as blaming direct-toconsumer advertising of expensive, unnecessary drugs for a 14% rise in drug
expenditures, and reporting that GM spent $55 million in 2001 to pay for Prilosec, a
heavily-advertised heartburn medication, for its workers and retirees).
224
Id. (quoting an insurance company executive as saying, “[d]irect-to-consumer
ads make drugs cost more”).
225
This argument has an analogy in current litigation against handgun
manufacturers. Cities have attempted to sue handgun manufacturers in tort,
claiming that they have been injured by crimes committed with handguns negligently
sold in circumstances which the gun manufacturers knew or reasonably should have
known would result in those guns being used in illegal activity. See, e.g., James v.
Arms Tech., Inc., 820 A.2d 27, 34-35 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (denying
defendants’ motion to dismiss lawsuit because the City of Newark had stated a claim
against multiple defendants for negligence in distribution and sale of handguns).
Many states and cities plagued by gun violence have passed strict laws barring
handgun sales within their jurisdiction. See, e.g., Quilici v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 695
F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982) (upholding local handgun ban against constitutional
challenge). Plaintiffs have alleged, however, that handgun manufacturers knowingly
or recklessly sell to dealers in neighboring jurisdictions with lax gun laws, enabling
the weapons to be transported and sold illegally in the targeted jurisdictions. See
generally Tyrone Hughes, Note & Comment, Hamilton v. Accutek: Potential Collective
Liability of the Handgun Industry for Negligent Marketing, 13 TOURO L. REV. 287 (1996).
The case law described in this section is still in the developmental stages and
substantial uncertainties remain. These uncertainties include the strong possibility
of Congressional action to prohibit handgun manufacturer lawsuits and to put an
end to those lawsuits currently pending. See Andrew Harris, Court Reinstates Indiana
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As described above, prescription drugs are increasingly being
sold through non-traditional channels and increasingly are available
outside a meaningful doctor–patient relationship or without a
226
prescription from a licensed physician.
These sales, under the
current approach to the learned intermediary rule, carry a higher
risk of injury or death resulting from improper use of the drug
because no actor in the supply chain has a realistic legal incentive to
warn the end user of the product’s dangers. Particularly in cases of
“lifestyle” drugs, consumers may not be mindful of the dangers posed
by those products in the context of their wide availability, and so
might not undertake a realistic cost–benefit analysis before deciding
whether to use them. The Internet pharmacy and the physician, if
any, providing the prescription for the drug may be judgment proof,
located outside the jurisdiction of American courts, or otherwise
inaccessible. The current learned intermediary rule, however, forces
the injured plaintiff to rely on the prescribing physician for legal
recourse, even when all actors in the chain know or should know that
the prescription is being filled in the absence of an effective doctor–
patient relationship, and a reasonable informed consent discussion.
The alternative Rule proposed in this Article would protect the
consumer by removing the protections of the learned intermediary
rule from the drug manufacturer when the manufacturer knows or
should know that there is in fact no effective intermediary, and by
also providing incentives to drug manufacturers not to sell their
products through channels in which no legally effective warning is
likely to be given.
III. A PROPOSAL
A. The Contours of the Proposal
The proposal advanced in this Article starts from a very basic
premise: The learned intermediary rule should not apply when the
227
reasoning behind the rule is not applicable.
Because of recent
Gun Suit, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 5, 2004, at 5 (describing the Senate version of the Firearms
Manufacturer Protection Bill as “just five [votes] shy of a filibuster-proof majority that
would ensure its passage”). Other potential problems include the difficulty of
establishing a causal link between an allegedly negligent sale and the injury caused to
the plaintiff. Nonetheless, the courts have the opportunity to establish incentives for
handgun manufacturers to police the sales practices of those with whom they do
business by integrating the social cost of those products into their price. This
argument can easily be applied by analogy to prescription drug manufacturers in the
modern pharmaceutical marketplace.
226
See supra Part II.A.
227
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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228

changes in the pharmaceutical industry, courts should no longer
assume that drug sales should be subject to the learned intermediary
229
rule. Instead, courts will need to undertake a fact-based analysis of
230
this issue. The goal of this Article is to give courts a methodology
for taking into account the diversity of the modern pharmaceutical
231
marketplace.
The overwhelming majority of courts have applied the Rule as a
blanket exemption from the duty to warn of standard products
liability doctrine, without a fact-based inquiry into the necessity or
232
desirability of the rule.
While the learned intermediary rule
233
remains a justifiable rule in many instances, failure by courts to
228

See supra Part II.A.
See, e.g., Swayze v. McNeil Labs., Inc., 807 F.2d 464, 470 (5th Cir. 1987)
(construing the mass vaccine exception narrowly as “an exception to the general rule
that, where prescription drugs are concerned, a manufacturer’s duty to warn extends
only to physicians and not to laymen”). Although the result in Swayze was probably
correct, this reasoning is a misapplication of the maxim that exceptions to general
rules of law are to be construed narrowly. The Swayze court failed to account for the
fact that the learned intermediary rule is itself a narrow exception from the general
rule that the duty to warn runs to the end user of the product. See also Stanback v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 657 F.2d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1981) (describing the mass vaccine
exception as “quite narrow and highly fact specific”).
230
See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and
Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001)
(discussing how history shapes legal decisions). Professor Hathaway writes:
Lock-in or inflexibility can, in turn, lead to inefficiency. Early decisions
may lead to formation of a legal rule that becomes increasingly
inefficient over time. . . . External circumstances may change, causing
what was once an efficient rule to become inefficient in light of the
changed context. Or what is an efficient rule in one case may be much
less efficient in a somewhat different context. Or new information may
become available that changes the perception of the legal issue and its
correct resolution. Or, finally, courts may take what was an efficient
rule in a narrow set of circumstances and broaden it to encompass a set
of circumstances in which it is less efficient.
Id. at 631.
231
See, e.g., Afield, supra note 97, at 224 (arguing for a flexible approach in
antitrust cases, Afield observes that “the variety in prescription drugs today . . .
indicates that perhaps pharmaceutical consumers need to be defined on a drug-bydrug basis”). There is no logical reason why this proposed flexibility cannot also be
applied to the analysis of prescription drug failure-to-warn claims, allowing the courts
to ascertain whether the doctor–patient relationship which stands at the heart of the
learned intermediary rule in fact justifies the Rule’s application.
232
See supra Part I.C; see also Mitchell S. Berger, A Tale of Six Implants: The Perez v.
Wyeth Laboratories Norplant Case and the Applicability of the Learned Intermediary Rule to
Direct-to-Consumer Drug Promotion, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 525, 546 n.230 (2000).
233
This Article does not argue that drug manufacturers should never be able to
delegate their duty to warn to physicians. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 47–
49 (discussing reasons why the traditional doctor–patient relationship stood as a bar
to drug manufacturer’s liability for failure to warn).
229
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inquire into the justifications for the rule on a case-by-case basis runs
the risk that the Rule will devolve into a convenient fiction that
protects drug companies from the consequences of their marketing
234
practices.
One approach to known inadequacies of a common law rule
(such as the learned intermediary rule) is to adopt a series of
exceptions to the rule in order to ameliorate some of the perceived
235
injustices that result from its application.
This approach is useful
for a time, but eventually, the law must ask whether it would not be
more appropriate to revise the rule itself to eliminate the need for
the exceptions, rather than continuing to create bright-line
236
This time has now come for the learned
exceptions to the rule.
intermediary rule. The existing exceptions, though grounded on
valid criticisms of the Rule, do not accomplish the goal of

234

See, e.g., Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 2002-SC-0746-CL, 2004 WL 1361954, at *11
(Ky. June 17, 2004) (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting) (“Given that the manufacturers
are now directly marketing and benefiting by increased sales, they must also assume
increased share in the risks and duties pertinent to selling a product.”).
235
Another example of this type of common law evolution is found in the privity
of contract requirement. Originally, claims arising out of injuries caused by defective
products required an allegation of privity of contract. See Winterbottom v. Wright,
152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). Perceiving a need to extend a remedy to plaintiffs
injured by products purchased by another, the courts created an exception to the
privity requirement for products which were “of such a character inherently that,
when applied to the purposes for which [they were] designed, [they were] was liable
to become a source of great danger to many people . . . .” Statler v. George A. Ray
Mfg. Co., 88 N.E. 1063, 1064 (N.Y. 1909). Eventually, the difficulty associated with
administering the “inherently dangerous” exception led to the elimination of the
requirement of privity of contract in negligence actions. MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1052 (N.Y. 1916) (“[F]or a neglect of such ordinary care or skill
whereby injury happens, the appropriate remedy is an action for negligence. The
right to enforce this liability is not to be confined to the immediate buyer.”). For a
more in-depth discussion of this doctrinal evolution, see generally Hathaway, supra
note 230.
236
The process of carving out exceptions to a common law doctrine in order to
rectify its shortcomings has its limits. See, e.g., Melissa A. Waters, Common Law Courts
in an Age of Equity Procedure: Redefining Appellate Review for the Mass Tort Era, 80 N.C. L.
REV. 527, 556 (2002) (criticizing the process of “carving out more and more
exceptions to the [common law final judgment] rule,” consequently resulting in the
“dizzying array of statutory and judicially-created exceptions . . . that make up
modern finality jurisprudence”); The Honorable Francis J. Connolly, Casenote,
Landlord/Tenant Law—Code Violations Under Negligence Per Se and Common Law
Negligence Theories: Gradjelich v. Hance, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1013, 1014 (2003)
(noting arguments that exceptions to the common law rule of no landlord liability
“contribute[] to the ‘erosion of the entire common law rule’”) (citation omitted);
Matthew F. McLean, Casenote, The Impact of the Wyoming Supreme Court’s Decision to
Abolish a Portion of the Common Law Status Classifications. Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d
293 (Wyo. 1993), 29 LAND & WATER L. REV. 299, 301-11 (1994) (describing evolution
of common law of possessor’s duty of care to third parties).
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harmonizing the Rule’s operation with the realities of the health care
237
marketplace. In fact, the diversity and pace of change in the health
care market is such that no set of bright-line rules can hope to
adequately police the therapeutic decision-making process.
The determination of whether the learned intermediary rule is
appropriate should not turn, as it does now, solely on the type of
drug or product being prescribed, but rather on the context of the
interaction that produces the prescription. The existing case law
establishes exceptions to the Rule based on the specific drug or type
of drug at issue. For example, several cases hold that oral
contraceptives, as a class, are exempt from the learned intermediary
238
rule.
This has the benefit of judicial economy and ease of
239
application, but it does not capture the diversity of contexts in
which drugs are prescribed and obtained.
I propose that the learned intermediary rule be transformed
from a bright-line rule of exemption from liability for failure to warn
the end user of a prescription drug into a multi-element test to
determine the presence or absence of a meaningful intermediary in
the prescription drug context. Under this revised conception of the
Rule, the emphasis should be on a manufacturer’s duty to warn an
end user of an unavoidably unsafe product, and courts should
analyze each particular set of circumstances in evaluating whether a
warning to the only intermediary is legally adequate.
I propose that the learned intermediary rule should be recast as
follows:
A manufacturer has the duty to warn the ultimate user of an
unavoidably unsafe product, notwithstanding the fact that the
product is sold to an intermediary or that the product is legally
unobtainable without recourse to an intermediary.
A
manufacturer may discharge its duty to warn by warning only the
intermediary when it knows or has reason to know that the
intermediary is in a position to minimize the risk posed by the
product.

In the context of prescription drug failure-to-warn litigation, a
court should take into account the following list of factors in
determining whether it is appropriate to warn only the intermediary:
1. Was the drug prescribed in the context of a face-to-face doctor–
patient interaction?
237

Cf. Hathaway, supra note 230, at 658-61 (arguing for relaxation of stare decisis
where “underlying conditions have changed markedly since the legal rule’s
introduction”).
238
See supra Part I.B.2.
239
Ausness, supra note 147, at 1235-36.
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2. Was the drug specifically requested by the patient?
3. Does the patient have an ongoing opportunity to engage the
physician in a dialogue about the efficacy of the treatment
prescribed?
4. Did the patient seek the drug to treat a medical condition, or
for its convenience or cosmetic enhancement effects?
5. Does relevant regulation require that the patient be directly
warned of the risks of the drug?

These factors have the benefit of integrating all of the current
exceptions to the learned intermediary rule, as well as focusing the
attention of the courts on other aspects of a drug sale that are
relevant to the application of the Rule.
The fundamental
requirement for exemption from the duty to warn the end user is
that there is in fact an effective intermediary between the
240
manufacturer and the user of the product.
This revised learned intermediary rule reflects the reasoning of
courts that have considered other exceptions to the rule. The theme
underlying those exceptions is the search for circumstances under
which the physician does not in fact act as an effective learned
intermediary for the patient. These circumstances can be divided
into two categories: (1) circumstances in which the physician’s
prescribing power is bypassed through use of modern sales practices
such as Internet prescribing and dispensing of drugs absent physician
contact with the patient; i.e., where the physician is not acting as an
intermediary at all; and (2) circumstances in which, even though
there is physician–patient contact, the physician does not exercise his
or her independent judgment or does not in fact provide an
adequate set of warnings; i.e., where the “learned” nature of the
physician’s contribution to the decision-making process is bypassed.
This may include situations in which the choice to take the drug is a
cosmetic one, not a medical one, and in which the physician is
perhaps more likely to merely acquiesce in the patient’s demand for
241
the drug,
as well as cases in which a drug company has
240

As with the sophisticated user doctrine, the learned intermediary rule should
be applied as a defense to tort liability for failure to warn. Thus, in order to obtain
an exception from the general rule of tort law that the duty to warn flows from the
manufacturer of the product to the end user of that product, the initial burden
should fall on the drug company to bring forward facts indicating that the drug was
prescribed and delivered in a context providing for an effective intermediary.
241
The phenomenon of physician acquiescence to patient demands is not limited
to these “lifestyle” drug cases. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (describing
the over-prescription of antibiotics and the concurrent rise in drug resistant
pathogens).
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overpromoted a drug, creating demand in the minds of consumers
which overrides the contrary advice of their physicians.
The Rule proposed in this Article is consistent with and builds
242
on the insights of the Third Restatement.
Although the Third
Restatement preserves the formal separation between the sophisticated
243
244
user doctrine and the learned intermediary rule, it lays the
groundwork for collapsing the distinction between them, as
advocated in this Article. The Third Restatement provides that the duty
to warn in prescription drug cases is owed first to the physician, but
may be owed to “the patient when the manufacturer knows or has
reason to know that health care providers will not be in a position to
reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or
245
246
warnings.”
Unfortunately, as described above,
neither the
247
248
Restatement nor the courts have yet taken advantage of the text
of section 6(d) to amend the learned intermediary rule to take
account of the substantial changes in the health care marketplace.
This Article hopes to fill that gap.
B. Arguments for Retaining the Learned Intermediary Rule
The learned intermediary rule has demonstrated remarkable
persistence in the courts, despite an extensive body of scholarship
249
identifying the Rule’s shortcomings.
Those who would retain the
250
Rule in its current form generally make three arguments.
First,
they argue that the drug industry, unlike an individual’s physician,
does not have adequate means to identify and communicate with
potential consumers of a drug. Second, the current Rule’s advocates
maintain that patients with no medical or pharmacological training
will be unable to understand an adequate warning, and will either be
frightened away from a potentially beneficial drug or will not be able
to make an informed choice about the risks and benefits of a drug.
The physician, on the other hand, is in a position to “translate” the
242

See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 2(c) & cmt. i.
244
See, e.g., id. § 6(d).
245
Id. § 6(d)(2).
246
See supra Part I.D.
247
See THIRD RESTATEMENT supra note 7, § 6(d) & cmt. e.
248
See supra note 143.
249
See generally sources cited supra note 95; see also Catherine A. Paytash, Note, The
Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Patient Package Inserts: A Balanced Approach to
Preventing Drug-Related Injury, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (1999).
250
For a complete (and more sympathetic) articulation of the arguments for the
retention of the learned intermediary rule, see Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription
Drugs to Consumers: Assessing the Legal and Regulatory Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141 (1997).
243
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technicalities for the patient, and to assist in the risk-benefit analysis.
Finally, advocates of the Rule argue that inserting the drug
manufacturer into the therapeutic decision-making process by
requiring warnings to be given directly to patients would
impermissibly interfere with the doctor–patient relationship.
This section examines the bases of each of these claims and
shows that, although each of them can be leveled at the proposal
made in this Article, they ultimately fail to justify retention of the
current Rule.
1.

Inability to Communicate with Patient

The first argument made by advocates of the learned
intermediary rule is that, because the physician–patient relationship
provides an ideal context for communicating product warnings, and
because of the burdens and costs involved in attempting to provide
adequate warnings to end users of prescription drugs, manufacturers
251
should be relieved of a duty to warn the end user.
Even under the sophisticated user doctrine, inability to
communicate effectively with the end user has been held to abrogate
252
253
the duty to warn.
In House v. Armour of America, a police officer
injured by rifle fire sued the maker of the bulletproof fibers used in
his protective jacket, arguing that the fiber maker should have had a
duty to warn him about the limitations of the protection offered by its
254
product. The court held, as a matter of law, that the lack of a viable
means of communication between the component part supplier and
the end user of the bulletproof vest made from its materials vitiated
the duty to warn the individual user, and that the warning to the
255
police department discharged the manufacturer’s duty.
If drug manufacturers truly could not effectively communicate
with the end users of their products, the retention of the learned
intermediary rule as an incentive to make sure adequate warnings
251

For a discussion of the use of this justification in the litigation surrounding the
Dalkon Shield contraceptive device, see James Ottavio Castagnera & Richard Ryan
Gerner, The Gradual Enfeeblement of the Learned Intermediary Rule and the Argument in
Favor of Abandoning It Entirely, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 119, 126-28 (2000).
252
This is so because “[t]he goal of products liability law is to ‘induce conduct
that is capable of being performed.’” Hoffman v. Houghton Chem. Corp., 751
N.E.2d 848, 857 (Mass. 2001) (quoting Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696
N.E.2d 909, 922 (Mass. 1998)). If manufacturers truly could not communicate with
patients, it would make no sense to impose such a duty. This assertion may have
been true in 1966; however, it is no longer the case.
253
886 P.2d 542 (Utah 1994).
254
Id. at 546.
255
Id. at 554.
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flowed through the prescribing physician would be justified. The
behavior of drug companies, however, belies the argument that
effective communication between manufacturers and patients is
256
impossible or impracticable.
Drug companies routinely
communicate with patients through direct-to-consumer print and
broadcast advertising, informational Web sites, and other media, and,
in some cases when required by the FDA, through patient package
257
inserts distributed with each prescription.
Each of these means of
communication could be adapted to the delivery of legally adequate
warnings to the patient, when required by the revised rule.
A more likely scenario is that in some cases, communication
between the drug company and patients would be relatively simple,
258
and in other cases, far more complex. Assuming this to be the case,
it makes sense to have a legal rule that can take account of the
diversity of circumstances under which prescription drugs are used.
While the learned intermediary rule as currently implemented
assumes communication to be impracticable, and abolition of the
Rule would assume communication to be feasible, the modified Rule
proposed in this Article allows the reasonableness of communication
in any given set of circumstances to be weighed by the finder of fact
in determining the reasonableness of the drug manufacturer’s
259
conduct.
2.

Inability of Patient to Understand Warnings

Pharmacology is a complex field, and there is no doubt that a
full understanding of the mechanisms of action and potential for

256

See Castagnera & Gerner, supra note 251, at 132 (“Through [] zealous
marketing tactics, manufacturers display the means necessary to adequately inform
the patient about all product properties necessary to make an informed and
educated decision.”).
257
See, e.g., id. at 123-24 (advocating that burden be placed on manufacturer to
“provide adequate warnings in the form of patient package inserts . . . to the patient
with every prescription that is filled”). The authors point out that this is also
consistent with modern ethical emphasis on the patient’s right to participate fully in
decisions concerning his health care. Id. at 124; see also supra Part II.B.
258
For an example of the latter, recall the facts of Gravis v. Parke-Davis & Co., 502
S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), discussed supra notes 44-49 and accompanying
text. Gravis involved a claim of injury arising from the use of a surgical anesthetic. It
seems reasonable to conclude that the drug manufacturer would have fewer
channels of communication with the patient than in a case involving a prescription
for antibiotic tablets filled at a pharmacy.
259
See, e.g., SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 388 cmt. n (“Here, as in every
case which involves the determination of the precautions which must be taken to
satisfy the requirements of reasonable care, the magnitude of the risk involved must
be compared with the burden which would be imposed by requiring them . . . .”).
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interactions associated with prescription drugs requires advanced
study. It is also true that most patients cannot understand the
information communicated by drug companies to physicians through
260
sources such as the Physicians Desk Reference. To claim, however, that
drug companies are incapable of delivering adequate risk
information to potential patients fails to recognize at least two
features of the modern health care market. First, many complex
drugs are in fact sold directly to consumers, without recourse to the
261
expertise of the physician.
Second, the success of the
pharmaceutical industry in communicating with patients and
potential patients through direct-to-consumer advertising channels
undercuts the argument that consumers are incapable of
understanding the risks and benefits of a particular drug.
3.

Interference with the Doctor–Patient Relationship

A third argument advanced in favor of retaining the learned
intermediary rule is that direct warnings from the manufacturer
would impermissibly interfere with the therapeutic relationship
262
between doctor and patient. While it is certainly true that medical
decisions are best made in the context of a meaningful, trust-based
doctor–patient relationship, the law should also recognize that many
medical decisions are in fact not informed by such a relationship. In
these cases, the law should not leave consumers of prescription drugs
without any remedy against those who had an opportunity, but failed
260

Foreward to PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE (58th ed. 2004) (“Each . . . entry
provides . . . an exact copy of the product’s FDA-approved . . . labeling.”)
261
The market for over-the-counter (“OTC”) drugs is vast, comprising $11.2
billion in sales and up to an estimated 300,000 products in 1990. GEN. ACCT. OFF.,
NON-PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: OVER THE COUNTER AND UNDEREMPHASIZED 1 (1992).
Despite the fact that OTC drugs are readily available to consumers without the need
for the professional intervention of a physician or pharmacist, one should not
assume that OTC drugs are free from risk See id. at 2. Manufacturers of OTC drugs
do not enjoy the same freedom from liability for failure to warn as do manufacturers
of prescription drugs. Nonetheless, manufacturers seem to have adequately
discharged their duties to warn consumers of the potential dangers of these
products. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1275-76 (5th Cir. 1974)
(observing that if defendant concedes its product is not a prescription drug, then its
sole warning to the health care provider “establishes as a matter of law the
defectiveness of the [product] for purposes of a prima facie case in strict products
liability”); Torsiello v. Whitehall Labs., 398 A.2d 132, 139-40 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1979) (“A consumer of over-the-counter drugs is . . . self-prescribing and is
intended, expected, and indeed encouraged by the drug industry to do so. He must,
therefore, also be given such information by the manufacturer as will permit him to
self-prescribe with a minimum of risk.”), cited with approval by Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc.,
No. 2002-SC-0746-CL, 2004 WL 1361954, at *4 (Ky. June 17, 2004)).
262
Noah, supra note 250, at 170.
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to provide adequate warnings of the dangerous propensities of their
products. In fact, some have argued that, if we as a society take the
doctor–patient relationship seriously, we should ban drug
advertisements altogether. Indeed, it seems somewhat disingenuous
for pharmaceutical manufacturers to argue that drug advertisements
do not interfere with the doctor–patient relationship, but that drug
263
warnings do.
Following the reasoning of the pro-DTC advertisement literature
provides another argument for rethinking the learned intermediary
rule in this context. If consumer-directed advertising enhances the
information available to the consumer and thus makes the consumer
a more effective and more informed partner in his own health care
decisions, surely legal rules which encourage full and fair disclosure
of both the benefits and risks of drug therapies would only further
264
contribute to consumer education and empowerment.
The proposal set forth in this Article is not necessarily an
exclusively pro-plaintiff rule. For example, recall the case of Edwards
265
v. Basel Pharmaceuticals. In that case, Edwards died from a nicotine
overdose after receiving a prescription for a nicotine patch from his
personal physician.
Absent further evidence of circumstances
impairing the effectiveness of the physician–patient relationship, the
reworked Rule proposed herein would not change the outcome of
the case in favor of Edwards. The existence of the FDA mandate to
warn the patient should be considered simply as one factor among
many related to Edwards’ decision to use the product, and should not
necessarily result in drug company liability. It may be that Edwards’
recourse, if any, should be against his physician for failure to clearly
communicate the information contained in the manufacturer’s
warning to the physician, which plainly disclosed the risk of cardiac
266
failure from a nicotine overdose.
263

Cohoon, supra note 95, at 1356-57.
Following the reasoning of the proponents of direct-to-consumer marketing
provides another argument for rethinking the learned intermediary rule. If
consumer-directed advertising enhances the information available to the consumer,
and thus makes the consumer a more effective and more informed partner in his
own health care decisions, surely legal rules that encourage full and fair disclosure of
both the benefits and the risks of drug therapies would only further contribute to
consumer education and empowerment. See, e.g., Castagnera & Gerner, supra note
251, at 132-33 (“Rather than undermine the physician-patient relationship, a
requirement that manufacturers provide direct-to-consumer warnings in reality
encourages the patient to question the doctor, thus improving patients’ ability to
make informed decisions and understand their treatment.”).
264
See supra note 263.
265
116 F.3d 1341 (10th Cir. 1997); see supra Part I.B.3.
266
Id. at 1342 (finding that the warnings given to physicians were “relatively
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C. Benefits of the Proposal
1.

Better Serves the Goals of Tort Law

Treatment of the learned intermediary rule in a case-by-case
fashion, instead of as a bright-line exemption from the duty to warn
the end user, will result in a rule which is more likely to accomplish
the goals of tort law. Tort law is generally understood to have three
primary functions: deterrence of socially undesirable conduct,
compensation of the injured, and, in the case of product liability,
allocation of the true costs of producing a product to the
267
manufacturer of that product. The proposed rule accomplishes all
three functions better than the existing learned intermediary rule.
First, the proposal would deter certain behavior on the part of
drug manufacturers. Under current law, a drug manufacturer is
268
extremely unlikely to be held responsible in tort for statements
made in consumer advertisement materials that create a false positive
expectation about the benefits of a drug, or which downplay the risks
of a drug. Despite the existence of some FDA guidance on the
content of direct-to-consumer advertisement, many believe that
existing FDA rules do not adequately protect the interests of
consumers in accurate information about prescription drugs, and
that many manufacturers in fact do not adequately comply with even
the minimal regulations in place. The potential for tort liability
would help ensure that information conveyed to consumers about a
prescription drug is accurate and balanced. Furthermore, this rule
would give drug manufacturers an incentive to police and prevent the
sale of prescription drugs into potentially illegal market channels,
269
where sales would occur without a physician’s prescription.
thorough” but that “a package insert addressed to the patient failed to mention the
possibility of any fatal reaction to nicotine overdose”).
267
Absent a tort-like mechanism for requiring manufacturers to bear the cost of
injuries caused by defective products, manufacturers would have insufficient
incentive to police the safety of their products, since the cost of injuries caused by
those products would be borne by the injured individuals or the health insurance
system. This would constitute an undesirable subsidy for the product manufacturers,
and would undesirably lower the cost of dangerous products. SECOND RESTATEMENT,
supra note 18, § 402A cmt. c (“[P]ublic policy demands that the burden of accidental
injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who
market them, and be treated as a cost of production . . . .”).
268
Only one reported case has established an exemption from the learned
intermediary rule for direct-to-consumer advertising. See supra Part I.B.4 (discussing
the New Jersey Supreme Court’s Perez decision).
269
Of course, this presupposes that drug companies are able to identify
purchasers who are likely to sell prescription drugs inappropriately. Indications are
that manufacturers do in fact have such information at their disposal; for instance,
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Second, the proposal would ensure that drug manufacturers
bear a greater share of the costs of injuries caused by prescription
drugs when those drugs are not dispensed in the context of a strong
doctor–patient relationship. Under the existing rule, as long as drug
manufacturers provide the FDA-mandated “brief summary”
information to prescribing physicians, the only basis of liability for
failure to warn is through a challenge to the content of the warning
given to the physician. If the drug was in fact purchased outside the
context of a physician–patient relationship, or if the physician did not
270
heed the warning provided, there may be no recourse at all. This
means that a large proportion of the avoidable injuries caused by
prescription drugs are beyond the concern of drug companies, who
are able to transfer these losses to the injured consumers themselves,
or to the physician who prescribed the drug. Since the drug
companies have no legal liability in this situation, the true social cost
of the drug is not reflected in its price, causing the drug to be
overconsumed. This is particularly troublesome in cases of “lifestyle”
drugs, which are prescribed and desired for cosmetic or convenience
reasons. There is no reason for society to provide a subsidy to the
manufacturers and consumers of these drugs in the form of costs
borne by injured consumers.
Finally, the proposed rule would increase the availability of tort
compensation in cases of injury caused by prescription drugs. In
cases in which the drug manufacturer contributed to the demand for
the drug by direct-to-consumer advertising, or contributed to the
availability of the drug through sales into channels where the
manufacturer knew or should have known that the product was likely
to be sold to the end user outside the context of a physician–patient
relationship, the patient injured by improper use of the drug may
Pfizer recently reacted to the phenomenon of Americans crossing the border into
Canada to take advantage of that country’s price controls on prescription drugs by
threatening to restrict supply to Canadian pharmacies supplying the American
market. Marketplace, NPR radio broadcast, July 7, 2004. This tends to show that
Pfizer is able to (or would be able to if it chose) track the flow of drugs to Canada
and through the pharmacies there back into the United States.
270
See Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that, if
physician did not read warning provided by drug company, then plaintiff cannot
establish that injury could have been avoided with a better warning, consequently
destroying causation element of plaintiff’s prima facie case). Although there are as
yet no reported cases alleging failure to warn where the drug in question was
purchased through an Internet pharmacy without a valid prescription, a court might
find the same defect in causation to exist in that case. In the absence of a duty to
warn the end user, however, merely requiring manufacturers to give better
alternative warnings to physicians will not change the outcome or prevent injury.
Thus, injured consumers are left without a remedy.
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have no legal recourse against the physician or seller of the drug.
In these cases, tort law in its current form fails to adequately protect
the injured party. By reaffirming the rule of tort law that, absent a
clear justification to the contrary, warnings are owed to the end user
of an unavoidably unsafe product, the proposal would protect
consumers in two ways. First, it would potentially decrease the
overpromotion of drugs encouraged by current law, and make it
more likely that a potential consumer of a drug will receive an
272
effective warning. Second, in cases of overpromotion, or direct-toconsumer sales, in the absence of a legally effective warning, the rule
would provide a source of compensation for avoidable harm
273
suffered.
2.

Better Reflects Modern Medical Practice and Ethics

In addition to enhancing the socially desirable effects of tort law,
the rule proposed in this Article also has the benefit of reforming tort
law to more accurately reflect the modern view of the doctor–patient
relationship. This section will describe how the reformed rule
interacts with medical practice and medical ethics.
The modern doctor–patient relationship is generally considered
274
to be grounded in the autonomy of the patient.
The physician is
not the sole decision maker, but has the role of faciliting and making
possible the patient’s exercise of autonomy in choosing from the
appropriate range of therapeutic options. In order to exercise his
right to make decisions regarding “what shall be done with his own
275
body,” the patient requires access to appropriate risk and benefit
information. Better information to the patient, from whatever
source, translates into better health care decision making, improved
patient compliance with treatment protocols, and, ultimately,
271

In these cases, the patient may not be able to show causation between the
action of the physician and the use of the drug (in cases where the patient engaged
in forum-shopping to obtain the drug, for example), or may not be able to obtain
jurisdiction over the seller (in cases of offshore Internet pharmacies, for example).
272
See infra notes 223–24 and accompanying text.
273
The major advantage to a bright-line rule in this context is that of judicial
economy. In litigating the current learned intermediary rule, defendants need not
inquire into the existence of a viable, protective doctor–patient relationship. This
judicial economy comes, however, at the expense of plaintiffs who are injured by
prescription drugs obtained without the protection of a strong doctor–patient
relationship. It is the contention of this Article that the better approach in choosing
a legal rule to apply is to privilege patient protection over ease of application.
274
See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 205, at 57-104
275
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting
Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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276

improved health outcomes.
The rule proposed in this Article
should have the effect of improving both the amount and the quality
of information provided to the patient.
Furthermore, the revision of the learned intermediary rule as a
standard-based rather than a bright-line test means that courts can
more easily respond to market innovations and new practices on the
part of drug manufacturers. Currently, courts are relatively limited in
their ability to articulate new exceptions to the default, “no duty to
warn the patient,” learned intermediary rule. Part of this limitation
springs from the common law doctrine of stare decisis; but part also
springs from the nature of the articulated exceptions. Under the
Rule as currently conceived, exemptions from the duty to warn only
the physician create categorical exceptions, which courts may fear will
be interpreted too broadly. For instance, the court in Perez v. Wyeth
277
Laboratories, in articulating an exception to the Rule for direct-toconsumer advertising, potentially opens the door for tort liability in
every case in which a directly advertised drug is involved. Because of
the categorical nature of the exception to the rule, there is relatively
little room for individualized assessments of the effect on this patient
of the specific advertisement at issue, and of the relationship between
that advertisement and other factors, such as the existence of a
doctor–patient relationship that might ameliorate the effects of any
278
overpromotion in the advertisement.
3.

Balancing Tests Versus Bright Lines

Even accepting arguendo the arguments made in favor of the
learned intermediary rule in some instances, it does not follow that
there should be an absolute exemption from the duty to warn the
end user of prescription drugs. The flexibility provided by the factors
279
enumerated above
provide sufficient opportunity for a drug
manufacturer defendant to argue that the duty to warn in a particular
case should run only to the prescribing physician or other learned
intermediary. The advantage of the proposal advanced in this Article
276

Increased information to the patient about potential adverse effects could also
improve outcomes by making patients more vigilant with respect to drug reactions,
leading to faster medical intervention. See 2 WOODSIDE, supra note 39, § 14.02[2][iv]
(discussing court’s rationale in Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961
(E.D. Wis. 1981), for applying contraceptive exception to learned intermediary rule).
277
734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999).
278
See id. at 1257 (holding that “the learned intermediary doctrine does not apply
to the direct marketing of drugs to consumers,” but not encouraging courts to
engage in case-by-case analysis of the effect of such marketing on the therapeutic
decision-making process).
279
See supra Part III.A.
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is that, unlike the Rule as it is currently applied, there is no resulting
injustice in those cases in which patients are harmed by prescription
pharmaceuticals obtained without the assistance and counsel of an
effective learned intermediary.
At least one other scholar has recognized the similarities
between the learned intermediary rule and the sophisticated user
doctrine. Writing in 1996, Professor Richard Ausness compared the
two doctrines and concluded: “Notwithstanding the fact that different
relationships may exist among the various parties, there is a certain
amount of commonality” between the paradigmatic learned
280
intermediary and sophisticated user fact patterns.
Ausness,
however, reaches a very different conclusion than this Article,
recommending an expansion of a bright-line, “duty-based” approach
281
in a wider variety of sophisticated user cases.
Ausness identifies three similarities between the learned
intermediary rule and the sophisticated user doctrine that justify
treating the two rules similarly. First, there is no direct contact
between the manufacturer and the user of the product. Second,
there are circumstances that make it difficult for the manufacturer to
communicate directly with the end user. Finally, the intermediary
282
has an independent legal duty to warn the end user. Ausness fails,
however, to take into account the fact that modern pharmaceutical
marketing and technological tools available to both drug
manufacturers and potential consumers of drugs have rendered these
factors, if not moot, then at least potentially inapplicable in particular
situations. It is the increased diversity of information and means of
delivering prescription drugs that creates the necessity for the
increased flexibility advocated in this Article.
Courts have generally declined to extend the learned
283
intermediary analysis into sophisticated user territory.
In Hall v.
284
plaintiffs’ decedent was, coincidentally, an
Ashland Oil Co.,
280

Ausness, supra note 147, at 1225. See also Carole A. Cheney, Comment, Not Just
for Doctors: Applying the Learned Intermediary Doctrine to the Relationship Between Chemical
Manufacturers, Industrial Employers, and Employees, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 562, 566 (1991)
(advocating application of learned intermediary analysis to the relationship between
industrial suppliers and employees of goods’ purchasers).
281
Ausness, supra note 147, at 1239-41.
282
Id., at 1225-26.
283
See Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 276 (Minn. 2004) (declining
to apply learned intermediary rule, in favor of sophisticated user doctrine, to
relationship between supplier a of chemicals and the injured employee of
purchaser).
284
625 F. Supp. 1515 (D. Conn. 1986); see also Donahue v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
866 F.2d 1008 (8th Cir. 1989) (refusing to apply learned intermediary rule in
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employee of pharmaceutical manufacturer Pfizer. The decedent had
been injured by the industrial chemical benzene, which Pfizer had
sold to Ashland Oil. When plaintiffs sued Ashland for failing to warn
them of the dangerous properties of the chemical, Ashland asserted a
learned intermediary defense for purposes of obtaining summary
285
judgment. The court rejected the learned intermediary defense in
this context, reasoning that there were significant differences
between the doctor–patient relationship and the employer–employee
286
relationship.
Since Ashland had to rely on the sophisticated user
doctrine, with its fact-based inquiry into the reasonableness of
reliance on the employer as an intermediary, its motion for summary
287
judgment was denied.
The proposal set forth in this Article has the dual advantages of
increasing the sensitivity of the tort system to the realities of the
health care marketplace, and of being relatively easy to implement. It
does not require the abrogation of any existing common law
doctrine, but merely calls for an adjustment of that doctrine to meet
the needs of a changed market. Nor does it depend on political will
to enact new statutes or regulations. Although some have called for
288
expanded FDA regulation in this area, the FDA has in fact been
notoriously slow to react to the new realities of the pharmaceutical
289
marketplace.
D. Coda: A Short Note on Preemption
A final issue facing any prescription drug tort regime is the
relationship between state tort law and the extensive federal
290
regulatory system governing the prescription drug industry.
The
employer–employee context under Missouri law); Todalen v. U.S. Chem. Co., 424
N.W.2d 73 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), overruled on other grounds, Tyroll v. Private Label
Chems., Inc., 505 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1993) (applying the same analysis as Hall).
285
Hall, 625 F. Supp. at 1516.
286
Id. at 1519-20.
287
Id. at 1522.
The distinction between the learned intermediary and
sophisticated user doctrines was not the only grounds for denial of summary
judgment, as other issues of material fact, such as the adequacy of the warning given
to Pfizer, existed in this case. Id. at 1520.
288
See, e.g., Castagnera & Gerner, supra note 251, at 125-26 (arguing for FDAmandated program of disclosure by drug companies through pharmacists).
289
An instructive example is the FDA’s reaction to the onset of direct-to-consumer
advertisement in the 1980s. Although the FDA did initially request a moratorium on
DTC advertising, it later abandoned that moratorium, claiming that existing
regulations written with advertisement to physicians in mind were adequate to
control DTC advertising. Hall, Promise and Peril, supra note 101, at 4-6.
290
See generally Ronald W. Eades, Attempts to Federalize and Codify Tort Law, 36 TORT
& INS. L.J. 1 (2000) (describing use of preemption analysis to create “federal
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FDA closely regulates virtually every phase of prescription drug
development and sale, from research and development through
291
manufacture and testing to labeling and distribution.
Further,
federal regulation of prescription drug products is explicitly aimed at
292
ensuring the safety and effectiveness of drugs sold to end users.
Although courts have traditionally rejected arguments that FDA
293
regulation preempts failure–to–warn cases, such arguments have
recently been buttressed by a few recently decided cases and signals
from the FDA demonstrating its willingness to support such
arguments.
In addition, the Third Restatement acknowledges
294
uncertainty on this issue.
This section briefly argues that
preemption of tort law by FDA regulation in this area is not a good
295
idea. A full discussion of the relationship between tort law and FDA
regulation, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
296
In 1996, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the United States Supreme
Court decided that federal regulation of medical devices does not
297
preempt the application of state tort law in cases involving injury
caused by those devices. Lora Lohr, the plaintiff/respondent in
Medtronic, was the recipient of a pacemaker manufactured by

defenses to state tort claims”).
291
See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-99 (2000 & Supp. I
2001).
292
U.S.
FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN.,
FDA’S MISSION STATEMENT,
at
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/mission.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).
293
See 2 WOODSIDE, supra note 39, § 14.04[3][c][iii], at 14-129 to -132; Michael I.
Krauss, Loosening the FDA’s Drug Certification Monopoly: Implications for Tort and
Consumer Welfare, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 457, 477 (1996) (citing Allen v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Or. 1989); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d
65 (Mass. 1985)).
294
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 7 cmt. e.
295
The drafters of the Third Restatement have expressed agreement with this
concept, in a comment to section 6. That comment states in part:
The doctrine of preemption based on supremacy of federal law should
be distinguished from the proposition that compliance with statutory
and regulatory standards satisfies that state’s requirement for product
safety. [Sections 6(c) and 6(d)] recognize common-law causes of
action for defective drug design and for failure to provide reasonable
instructions or warnings, even though the manufacturer complied with
governmental standards.
Id. § 6 cmt. b.
296
518 U.S. 470 (1996). For an excellent in-depth analysis of the Medtronic
decision, see generally Robert B. Leflar & Robert S. Adler, The Preemption Pentad:
Federal Preemption of Products Liability Claims After Medtronic, 64 TENN. L. REV. 691
(1997).
297
Although the claim in Medtronic did not involve failure-to-warn theory, but
rather design defect theory, Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 481, the type of product liability
claim should not have a material effect on the preemption analysis.
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298

petitioners.
When the product malfunctioned, forcing Lohr to
299
undergo emergency surgery to correct the problem, she sought
300
damages in tort under Florida law.
The Court noted that the
production and sale of the pacemaker device was regulated under the
Medical Device Amendments (“MDA”) to the Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act (“FDCA”), and that the MDA expressly prohibit any
state from “establish[ing] . . . any requirement—(1) which is different
from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this
chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or
effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a
301
requirement applicable to the device under [the Act].” The Court
concluded that, despite this language, the plaintiff’s tort claim was
not preempted, since state tort law did not involve a “requirement . . .
different from, or in addition to,” the FDA requirements under the
302
MDA.
Although Medtronic may illustrate a reluctance on the part of the
Court to preempt state tort law actions, there are several significant
differences between the operation of the MDA (with respect to
medical devices) and the FDCA (with respect to prescription drugs),
which would distinguish the Medtronic case from a potential case
arguing preemption in the prescription drug failure-to-warn context.
These differences also create substantial uncertainty as to the
outcome of a future case arguing preemption in the prescription
303
drug context.
First, the FDCA, unlike the MDA, contains no
304
express preemption language. This means that a court would have
305
to rely on an implied (conflict) preemption analysis, rather than
298

Id. at 480.
Id. at 481.
300
Id.
301
Id. at 481-82 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
302
See Leflar & Adler, supra note 296, at 701-10 (analyzing in detail the Medtronic
opinion). Significantly, four of the nine justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas) were willing to conclude that state tort law
did in fact impose an additional requirement on the manufacturer, and thus should
have been preempted. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 509-11 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
303
See Eades, supra note 290, at 15 (“Surprisingly, [Medtronic] has not proven to be
the final word on this issue . . . .”).
304
Compare 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2000) (expressly preempting state laws “(1) . . .
different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under [the MDA], and
(2) which relate[] to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter
included in a requirement applicable to the device under [the MDA”], with David G.
Owen, Federal Preemption of Products Liability Claims, 55 S.C. L. REV. 411, 428 (2003)
(describing FDCA’s lack of an express preemption clause).
305
See Leflar & Adler, supra note 296, at 695 (discussing the distinction between
conflict and field preemption and concluding that field preemption is virtually
299
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express preemption analysis, which would make it more difficult for a
defendant to claim preemption. Second, the device at issue in
Medtronic had not been rigorously evaluated by the FDA, but was
306
covered under the “grandfather clause” provisions of the MDA.
Intended as a temporary pro-competitive measure during the
implementation of the MDA, the grandfather clause, which allows the
marketing of medical devices substantially equivalent to a pre-MDA
device without pre-authorization by the FDA, has become the primary
307
route to market for new medical devices.
This stands in sharp
contrast to the extensive substantive FDA scrutiny of new prescription
308
It is possible that the comparatively heightened FDA
drugs.
scrutiny of new prescription drugs would lead the Court to conclude
that it is reasonable to substitute the FDA scrutiny for state tort law
regulation with respect to the drug’s safety.
Moreover, two cases decided since Medtronic, although not
overruling Medtronic, are arguably more pro-preemption, and could
be used to construct a case for FDA preemption of state law
309
prescription drug claims. In 2000, the Court held that common law
tort claims were preempted by provisions of the National Traffic and
310
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, which required passive restraints
311
in automobiles. Although the Court held that the state law claims
312
were not expressly preempted by the statute’s language, the tort
claim was implicitly preempted because of “actual conflict” between
tort standards and the passive restraint regulations written by the
313
Department of Transportation (“DOT”). The Court reasoned that
because DOT regulations explicitly sought to encourage a variety of
passive restraint mechanisms, phased in over time, the plaintiff’s
allegations that Honda’s failure to install one particular sort of
passive restraint (airbags) would undermine that regulatory
impossible to argue in the products liability context).
306
Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 477-78.
307
Id. at 479 (finding that 80% of new devices are deemed “substantially
equivalent” to a device already on the market and thus receive no independent FDA
review for safety and efficacy).
308
See Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription
Drugs and Medical Devices: Perspectives on Private Certification and Tort Reform, 48
RUTGERS L. REV. 883, 890-930 (1996) (detailing extensive FDA review process that
new drugs must undergo).
309
For a brief sketch of the pro-preemption analysis contained in this section, see
generally James Dabney Miller, Blocking Bad Claims, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 10, 2003, at 31.
310
Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (1966), repealed by Pub. L. 103-272, § 7(b), 108
Stat. 1379 (1994) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 30101 (2000)).
311
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 874-86 (2000).
312
Id. at 867-68.
313
Id. at 874-75.
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314

objective.
In 2001, the Court revisited the implied preemption debate,
again in the context of the MDA. In Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal
315
Committee, tort plaintiffs sought to hold the manufacturer of bone
screws liable for injuries allegedly caused by those products. Like the
pacemaker in Medtronic, bone screws are devices which would be
required to undergo full pre-marketing approval by the FDA, but for
316
the substantial equivalence exception.
Unlike Medtronic, the
plaintiffs in Buckman alleged that the manufacturer of the device
made false statements to the FDA in order to obtain a finding of
substantial equivalence and avoid substantive FDA review of the
317
Reasoning that the FDCA already provided statutory
device.
procedures for policing and responding to fraudulent applications,
the Court held that imposition of state tort law scrutiny of a
manufacturer’s FDA filings would necessarily conflict with those
procedures, and was thus impliedly, even though not expressly,
318
preempted.
The Court also addressed the relationship between Medtronic
and Buckman, since the plaintiffs in Buckman argued that Medtronic
319
saved their tort claim from preemption. The Court concluded:
[T]he Medtronic claims arose from the manufacturer’s failure to
use reasonable care in the production of the product, not solely
from the violation of FDCA requirements. . . . Thus, although
Medtronic can be read to allow certain state-law causes of action
that parallel federal safety requirements, it does not and cannot
stand for the proposition that any violation of the FDCA will
320
support a state-law claim.

The issue for tort defendants who seek to assert federal
preemption of failure-to-warn claims involving prescription drugs will
thus be the evolving definitional issue of which state law actions
321
“parallel federal safety requirements.”
Given that state-law failureto-warn actions implicate the traditional police powers of the State to
322
ensure the safety of its citizens, Buckman should not be read as
dictating preemption of failure-to-warn claims involving prescription
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322

Id. at 882-83.
531 U.S. 341 (2001).
Id. at 341.
Id.
Id. at 353.
Id. at 352-53.
Id.
Buckman, 531 U.S. at 353.
Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 475.
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drugs, notwithstanding the Court’s characterization of the claim in
323
Buckman as “policing fraud against federal agencies,” which gave
324
rise to “no presumption against pre-emption.”
The current Administration is actively pursuing federal
325
preemption of state tort law in the drug and device context.
Current results in the courts are mixed. In the Ninth Circuit case of
326
Motus v. Pfizer, plaintiff’s decedent committed suicide after being
327
prescribed the antidepressant drug Zoloft, manufactured by Pfizer.
The plaintiff did not allege that Pfizer should have warned the
patient directly, but alleged that the warning provided to the
328
prescribing physician was inadequate. Pfizer responded by arguing
that the warning given to the physician complied with FDA
requirements, and that plaintiff’s state law tort claim of its inadequacy
329
should be preempted.
The FDA filed an amicus brief with the
330
The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in support of preemption.
court, however, did not reach the preemption issue, holding instead
that, since decedent’s physician did not read or rely on Pfizer’s
warning, the inadequacy of that warning cannot have been the legal
331
cause of plaintiff’s injuries under controlling California law.
The FDA had more success in the Third Circuit case of Horn v.
332
Thoratec Corp. In that case, plaintiff’s decedent died after an alleged
malfunction of a heart pump manufactured by defendant. Plaintiff
sued on both design defect and failure-to-warn theories, but the
district court granted Thoratec’s motion for summary judgment on
the grounds that “‘any [state law] judgment that the [pump] was
unsafe or otherwise substandard would be in direct conflict [with] . . .
333
the FDA’s determination that the product was suitable for use.’”
323

Buckman, 531 U.S. at 347.
Id. at 348.
325
See Robert Pear, In a Shift, Bush Moves to Block Medical Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 25,
2004, at 1 (reporting that the “administration contends that consumers cannot
recover damages for such injuries if the products have been approved by the Food
and Drug Administration”).
326
Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004).
327
Id. at 660.
328
Id.
329
Brief for Appellee Pfizer Inc. at 62, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir.
2004) (Nos. 02-55372 & 02-55498), available at 2002 WL 32303085..
330
Brief for Amicus Curiae United States, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (9th
Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-55372 & 02-55498), available at 2002 WL 32303084.
331
Motus, 358 F.3d at 661 (citing Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 178 (Cal.
1993)).
332
376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004).
333
Id. at 165 (third alteration in original) (quoting Horn v. Thermo
Cardiosystems, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d 381, 390 (M.D. Pa. 2002)).
324
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The Third Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment,
distinguishing Medtronic on the grounds that the pump at issue in
Horn had been approved by the FDA after a full review of the device,
rather than under the limited “substantial equivalence” approval
334
granted to the device in Medtronic.
The court gave substantial
335
deference to the FDA’s new position in favor of preemption.
The preemption issue is an important aspect of failure to warn
336
in the prescription drug context, and the FDA’s position in the
Motus case, coupled with the slim margin in the Medtronic opinion,
signals that future failure-to-warn claims will be contested on
preemption grounds. Because of the importance and historical
337
prevalence of the state police power in this context, and because of
338
the FDA’s failure to act to ensure adequate warnings in the past, I
continue to believe that preemption is not appropriate in state
339
failure-to-warn claims involving prescription drugs.
The majority
position among state and federal courts is still opposed to
340
preemption in this context, and, subject to contrary holdings in the
future, this Article assumes that such broad preemption is
341
inappropriate.
334

Id. at 169-73.
Id. at 178-79.
336
The Third Restatement recognizes that a judicial finding of broad federal
preemption would render moot the precise contours of state common law failure-towarn claims. See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 6 cmt. b (making the
assumption “that the federal regulatory standard has not preempted the imposition
of tort liability under state law. When such preemption is found, liability cannot
attach if the manufacturer has complied with the applicable federal standard.”).
337
Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 475 (observing that “[t]hroughout our history the several
States have exercised their police powers to protect the health and safety of their
citizens”).
338
See Hall, Promise and Peril, supra note 101, at 3-8 (discussing the FDA’s failure to
adequately regulate DTC advertising).
339
Cf. Owen, supra note 304, at 441 (“[T]here is . . . no reason . . . why product
safety regulation and products liability litigation cannot comfortably co-exist.”).
340
See, e.g., Hurley v. Lederle Labs. Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 863 F.2d 1173,
1176-78 (5th Cir. 1988); Mazur v. Merck & Co., 742 F. Supp. 239, 245-47 (E.D. Pa.
1990); Feldman v. Lederle Labs, 592 A.2d 1176, 1178 (N.J. 1991); Kurer v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 679 N.W.2d 867, 874 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004).
341
Other scholars have been critical of broad federal preemption of tort law. See,
e.g., Eades, supra note 290, at 20-21 (“Tort law works because it is an immediate
response to local and even individual needs in a community. Attempts to nationalize
or make uniform that law detract from its ability to respond to the needs of
individuals in local communities.”). Of course, this does not prevent a state from
determining, as a matter of positive law, that compliance with federal standards
satisfies that state’s products liability law. See Leflar & Adler, supra note 296, at 694
(discussing state laws which give “conclusive effect . . . occasionally to compliance
with certain federal standards”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2946(5) (2004)
(establishing a conclusive presumption that compliance with FDA mandates satisfies
335
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CONCLUSION
342

The law must reflect commercial reality.
Unfortunately, the
pace of change in the health care marketplace over the past decade
has made it difficult for the common law, a fundamentally
conservative institution, to keep up with new developments. While
the modifications to the learned intermediary rule proposed in this
Article will make the Rule’s application somewhat more complex,
they have the advantage of realigning the Rule with the practices of
the health care marketplace, and thus enabling the tripartite
functions of the tort system—compensation, deterrence, and cost
allocation—to operate more efficiently. The marketplace for health
care services, including prescription pharmaceuticals, has evolved
beyond the point where a simple set of categorical exceptions to the
learned intermediary rule can effectively reflect the needs of
consumers of prescription drugs.
Where an effective intermediary exists, such as where a drug is
prescribed and administered within the context of a robust
physician–patient relationship, the purposes of tort law are best
served by applying the Rule to safeguard the drug manufacturer from
liability. We should recognize, however, that the modern health care
market has created several opportunities for a consumer to obtain
prescription drugs outside of such a relationship—situations that
diminish the role of the physician as educator and undermine the
doctor/patient relationship. Absent an effective intermediary, the
learned intermediary rule, while protecting the drug manufacturer,
fails to adequately protect the drug consumer. Furthermore, the
learned intermediary rule insulates drug manufacturers from the
incentives the tort system provides to take reasonable steps to ensure
that adequate warnings are provided to all users of a drug. By
reimagining the learned intermediary rule as a fact-based balancing
of interests, rather than a bright-line exemption from the usual duty
to warn a product’s end user, tort law can balance the interests of
drug manufacturers with those of consumers, and create incentives to
further reduce the incidence of injuries due to misuse of prescription
drugs.

state law regarding the adequacy of the warning given).
342
See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916)
(“Precedents drawn from the days of travel by stage coach do not fit the conditions of
travel [by automobile] to-day.”).

